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ABSTRACT
Essays on the Economics of Electricity
by
Reid M. Dorsey-Palmateer
Chair: Ryan Kellogg
This dissertation analyzes issues relating to the economics of electricity in Texas: im-
plications of wind generation intermittency, valuation of transmission lines and regulatory
policies surrounding retail electricity deregulation. Extensive government involvement in the
electricity market implies that an improved understanding of the economics of electricity can
lead to improved public policies in this area.
Chapter 1 analyzes the effect of wind power intermittency on generation costs and emis-
sions. Electricity generation and load must be close to equal at all times. However the ability
of wind turbines to generate electricity varies with wind conditions. This chapter finds ev-
idence that, while overall, wind generation reduces generation costs and CO2 emissions by
offsetting fossil fuel generation, wind generation intermittency is associated with a shift in
the fossil fuel generation mix from cheaper coal to more expensive, cleaner and more flexible
natural gas, with the associated impacts on emissions and costs.
Chapter 2 analyzes the recent expansion of transmission lines in the western part of
Texas to better access areas with high wind generation potential. While greater access to
xi
wind resources in western Texas will ultimately allow for reduced use of fossil fuel generation
and corresponding reductions in generation costs and pollution, the transmission grid ex-
pansion cost approximately $7 billion. This chapter compares the costs and benefits of this
transmission project and finds that the costs of this transmission expansion will consume a
non-trivial amount of the value of the additional wind generated.
Chapter 3 analyzes deregulation policies for retail electricity markets. In states where
consumers can select between retail electricity providers, consumers exhibit strong inertia
to stay with their current provider, leading to imperfect competition. Texas employed an
unusual approach to regulating the incumbent firm during the transition to a deregulated
market, forcing the incumbent to set a relatively high price to allow entrant firms to be more
competitive. This chapter models the retail electricity industry and finds that it is possible,
but not guaranteed, for a Texas-style approach with high temporary regulated prices on
the incumbent to result in superior outcome to an alternative transitional policy with lower
prices.
xii
CHAPTER I
The Effects of Wind Power Intermittency on
Generation and Emissions
1.1 Introduction
Electricity generation is a major source of air pollution in the United States, responsible
for 32% of greenhouse gas emissions in 2012. Because wind power does not generate any
emissions, it has been promoted as a clean way to generate electricity, with a variety of
government policies encouraging its use. However, wind power differs from fossil fuel gen-
eration in another way: its dependence on wind conditions which vary over time and are
imperfectly forecastable. In the absence of storage technology, electricity generation must
be continuously matched with consumption, so this wind power intermittency can affect the
operation of the electricity grid.1
Wind generation reduces the required amount of generation from other sources so if wind
generation capacity is relatively small compared to the overall electric load, any expected or
unexpected variation in wind generation may not be substantial relative to the short-run vari-
1Large scale storage of electricity is not currently feasible apart from hydropower. This chapter examines
the Texas market where hydropower is a very small part of the mix of generators.
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ation in electricity load. However if wind generation capacity is relatively large and changes
in wind generation are compensated for by changing fossil fuel generation levels, greater wind
intermittency could increase the optimal desired flexibility of fossil fuel generation.2
Thus because of its intermittency, wind power is imposing an externality on the rest
of the electricity grid: other generators, and potentially the demand-side, must respond to
changes in wind generation. Paying for reserve power and otherwise operating the grid in
a less cost-minimizing manner imposes a financial cost. Beyond financial costs, wind power
intermittency may have environmental externalities that should be accounted for as well.
Wind power intermittency could affect the emissions produced by electricity generation.
Fossil fuel generators differ with respect to their marginal costs, their ability to quickly adjust
output levels, as well as the pollution they produce. Compared to coal, natural gas generation
tends to be more expensive, less polluting and able to change output levels more rapidly. If
wind power intermittency shifts the mix of fossil fuel generation toward cleaner and more
flexible natural gas and away from coal, then this channel would reduce the pollution from
fossil fuel generation. However, efficiency of individual generation units varies with output,
generally with higher efficiency at higher output levels. If wind intermittency causes some
fossil fuel generators to be operated at lower output levels than would otherwise be the case,
this channel could increase their emissions rate (Bushnell and Wolfram [2005]). Furthermore,
when generator units are changing output levels, as would be the case when compensating
for wind power changes, they again lose efficiency and increase their emissions rate (Novan
[Forthcoming]).
2A 2008 report commissioned by ERCOT found that, for their model, when wind generation capacity in
Texas was at 5000 MW, the wind generation would have “a limited impact on the system...[its] variability
barely rising above the inherent variability caused by system loads”. But when wind generation capacity
increased to 10,000 MW, “the impacts become more noticeable” and by 15,000 MW, “the operational issues
posed by wind generation will become a significant focus of ERCOT operations” (General Electric [2008]).
2
Various government programs, such as the lapsed federal Production Tax Credit and
state-level renewable energy credits, have sought to increase the amount of wind genera-
tion.3,4 California, for example, has a goal of generating 33% of its electricity from renewable
sources by 2020. Historically, the value of these wind generation subsidies have at best only
been linked to the quantity of power generated by turbines. If the purpose of subsidizing
wind power is to reduce emissions, this subsidy policy would optimally instead connect the
value of the externalities imposed by wind generation to the value of the subsidy.5,6 Varying
subsidy levels across wind turbines based on their effect on emissions could lead to improved
siting decisions (Novan [Forthcoming]). If wind intermittency affects the operation of the
grid, subsidization policy would ideally incorporate wind generation intermittency and the
value of its corresponding externalities. This includes environmental externalities in addition
to imposed financial costs.
Other papers have looked at the integration of large quantities of intermittent generation
resources such as wind and solar into the electric grid (van Kooten [2010], DeCarolis and
Keith [2004], Gowrisankaran et al. [2014]).7 This set of papers uses ’engineering’ approaches
and models the dispatch of generation units. This approach is valuable for out-of-sample
prediction but in practice the results from engineering models of electric grids can often
deviate from what is ultimately observed (Callaway and Fowlie [2009]).8
3While wind generation does not pollute in the conventional sense, nearby residents can complain about
noise and unsightly turbines.
4Hitaj [2013] and Carley [2009] examine the effectiveness of programs at encouraging wind generation.
5Alternative polices such as cap-and-trade or a carbon tax could also be preferable to a subsidy for wind
generation, however this is beyond the scope of this chapter.
6The creation of “green jobs” has also been suggested as a rationale for subsidizing wind power (Obama
[2012]).
7Green and Vasilakos [2010] model how increased wind generation could affect market prices and output
with profit maximizing bidding.
8In a different context, Allcott and Greenstone [2012] discuss how engineering models of energy efficiency
often understate costs of improved energy efficiency.
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Instead of using a detailed dispatch model of the electricity grid, I use a regression
approach to estimate the impact of wind generation intermittency on the operation of the
electric grid and the resulting emissions. I use recent data from Texas, the state with the
most installed capacity for wind generation in the United States, from approximately 2011
to 2013
In Texas, wind was the source of approximately 10% of electricity in 2013 and the share
of total generation coming from wind power at a specific moment has reached as high as
36%. I obtain hourly data regarding emissions, fossil fuel generation and and both poten-
tial and actual wind generation. I find that wind power does have an effect on electricity
generation beyond reducing the necessary amount of generation from other sources. After
flexibly controlling for the level of fossil fuel generation, increased wind generation is asso-
ciated with shifting the fossil fuel generation mix away from coal and towards more flexible
natural gas generation. There is a corresponding increase in fuel costs and a decrease in CO2
emissions, indicating that the environmental effect from shifting the generation mix towards
cleaner natural gas dominates any increase in emissions due to increased ramping of fossil
fuel generators or operating at less efficient output levels.
This intermittency effect of wind generation on emissions is greater when natural gas
would otherwise comprise a smaller part of the generation mix, namely when total generation
is at lower levels and baseload coal generation is a larger part of the fossil fuel mix. While the
analysis in this chapter only uses Texas data, this does suggest that wind power intermittency
may have a larger impact on generation and emissions in regions where coal generation plays
a larger role. This result is similar to Holland and Mansur [2008], who find that reducing
daily electricity load variation has different effects on emissions depending on the generation
mix in the region.
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Examining the average impact of wind power intermittency effect does not distinguish
between the different forms that wind power intermittency can take. Wind generation levels
can vary in expected ways. Additionally, potential wind power could change in an unex-
pected manner if the forecasts are incorrect. These forecasts can have varying degrees of
confidence. When examining the effect of more specific measures of wind intermittency,
I find that variation in expected wind generation over a five-hour window (expected wind
power variation) is associated with a shift in fossil fuel generation towards natural gas. I
find a similar effect with increased uncertainty in wind power forecasts.
The estimates in this chapter are short-run effects that do not incorporate any long-
run adjustments to the set of generators available in Texas as a response to increased wind
generation capacity. Also, while total wind generation capacity did increase during the three
year period examined, a clear majority of the capacity was already installed in Texas at the
beginning of that three year period. Most of the observed variation in wind generation levels
is a result of changing wind conditions. The impact of installing additional wind turbines on
wind generation intermittency depends on how the new wind generation is correlated with
the previously installed capacity.
Thus while wind intermittency increases financial costs of generation, it also results in
reduced emissions by shifting fossil fuel generation towards cleaner natural gas generators.
When measuring the social cost wind intermittency imposes, the value of these environmental
benefits should be included. Using the estimates from Texas in this chapter and the U.S.
social cost of carbon estimates of $39/ton, the environmental benefit from increased wind
intermittency from a 1 MWh increase in wind generation is associated with a reduction
in CO2 emissions valued at $0.92.
9 This value is smaller than the increase in fuel costs
9This does not include the value of any emissions reductions besides CO2.
5
of $1.38, but nevertheless indicates a substantial fraction of those costs would be offset by
environmental benefits.
1.2 Modeling Effects of Uncertain Wind Generation
To illustrate two channels of the effect of wind generation on the electrical grid and emis-
sions, I use a simplified model of electricity generation. The planner must select a combi-
nation of generation sources to minimize costs with the constraint that the total generation
must equal the load. The quantity of electricity that needs to be supplied is imperfectly
forecast and the value of the load is distributed uniformly L ∼ U [(1− γ)L¯, (1 + γ)L¯].
Wind power is also imperfectly forecast and its value is also distributed uniformly W ∼
U
[
(1− ν)W¯ , (1 + ν)W¯ ].10,11 Uniform distributions are chosen for tractability. Wind gen-
eration has a per-MWh cost of zero.
Assume there are two other sources of power generation: coal and natural gas. Coal
and natural gas generation have per-MWh costs of cCoal and cNG respectively. Assume
cNG > cCoal. Additionally, let coal power have an inflexible output level that must be chosen
before the actual load and wind generation levels are determined. Natural gas generation is
adjustable and its output level can be selected after the load and wind generation levels are
known.
The lowest cost solution where W + qCoal + qNG = L is to set qCoal equal to the minimum
possible required generation, with the lowest realization of load and the highest realization
of wind generation. This is
10Assume that ν and γ are between zero and one.
11I abstract away from wind curtailment, or using less wind power than could be generated. In the context
of this model, however, wind curtailment would never be beneficial.
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qCoal = (1− γ)L¯− (1 + ν)W¯
The amount of natural gas generation will be the quantity that is required to set total
generation equal to total load, taking qCoal as given:
qNG = L−W − (1− γ)L¯+ (1 + ν)W¯
Increasing wind generation lowers the amount of natural gas generation.12 However,
increased forecast uncertainty (higher ν or γ) will lead to increased levels of natural gas
generation and lower amounts of coal. Because natural gas generation is more expensive and
cleaner than coal generation, this increased uncertainty will also lead to increased costs and
lower emissions levels. The relative value of these effects is unknown. This motivates the
empirical work in this chapter, which estimates the effect of wind generation intermittency on
the use of coal and natural gas generation, along with the corresponding effect on emissions
and generation costs.
1.3 Background
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) organizes the operation of the electricity
grid for about 75% of Texas, including 85% of the state’s electric load. ERCOT’s boundaries
are shown in Figure 1.1. Electricity generation can come from a variety of sources. Wind,
coal, nuclear and natural gas power are the dominant sources for ERCOT, comprising 99.2%
12In this simplified model, when wind generation reduces the total fossil fuel generation, only coal gener-
ation is lowered. In practice, this effect can reduce generation from both coal and natural gas power.
7
of total generation in 2013.13 With wind power accounting for 9.9% of generation in 2013,
ERCOT has the highest wind generation capacity of any U.S. state.
Wind generation capacity in Texas has grown quickly from near-zero levels in 2000,
though installation of additional wind generation capacity has slowed since 2009, as seen
in Figure 1.2.14 The actual quantity of wind power generated in ERCOT, dependent on
installed capacity, wind conditions and the ability of grid operators to dispatch the wind
power, has also grown over time, though less so since 2011, as seen in Figure 3. Wind
generation curtailment, where potential wind generation is not actually used, can occur and
is mostly due to transmission constraints between the western region of Texas containing
most of the wind generation capacity and the more populated regions. However, a long
term project to increase transmission capacity between these areas has substantially reduced
curtailment of wind power in recent years.15
Additionally, while the electrical grid in the rest of the continental U.S. is more inter-
connected, ERCOT is relatively isolated with only a small number of connections to other
regions, as seen in Figure 1.4.16 This isolation allows electricity dispatch operations within
Texas to largely be conducted independently of the surrounding regions.
Under the current nodal system, instituted on November 1, 2010, ERCOT runs both day-
ahead and real-time markets for electricity. Because electricity cannot be economically stored
13The remaining electricity is generated mainly by hydropower, solar and biomass.
14Little wind generation capacity became active in 2013; this was likely due to the lapsing of the federal
Production Tax Credit (PTC) at the end of 2012. In order to qualify for that subsidy, wind turbines needed
to be operational by the end of that year. Later legislation extended the PTC so that any turbine that
had begun construction by the end of 2013 would also qualify and additional turbines are expected to be
completed throughout 2014 and 2015.
15Chapter 2 examines the costs and benefits of this additional transmission expansion.
16There are two DC connections to the Southwest Power Pool (SPP) with a combined capacity of 820
MW and three DC connections to Mexico with a combined capacity of 286 MW. The DC connections allow
control over the flow of power. Additionally two power plants can generate electricity simultaneously for
both ERCOT and an outside grid.
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in large quantities, ERCOT identifies the most cost-effective way to generate electricity to
match the expected load while respecting the system constraints, such as those imposed
by the transmission lines.17 ERCOT also obtains reserve power so generation capacity is
available to either increase or decrease generation quickly in response to unexpected changes.
Wind generation units participate with the other generator types in the wholesale elec-
tricity markets run by ERCOT. Because wind power does not consume any fuel and is very
inexpensive to operate once built, these wind units generally, though not always, submit
very low bids and are dispatched whenever possible, given constraints on the electric grid.18
There are differences in their treatment because of the intermittent nature of wind power.
Penalties for deviating from the requested output are relaxed for wind generation units so
that wind generation can “follow the wind”. Additionally, wind forecasts are critical in deter-
mining maximum potential generation in future periods. When operators of wind generation
units report their maximum potential output level for each upcoming hour in the day-ahead
and reliability unit commitment markets, this value cannot exceed ERCOT’s forecast of
their potential wind generation. In the real-time market when dispatching wind turbines,
ERCOT uses a telemetered value based on current conditions at that generation site for the
17For the day-ahead market, bids for both supply and demand of electricity for each hour of the next day
at specific locations may be submitted to ERCOT by 10 AM. Unit characteristics such as minimum and
maximum output levels must also be submitted. ERCOT releases the results of this auction by 1:30 PM. This
stage of the market does not take ERCOT’s forecasted load into account and allows firms to reduce the price
risk of transacting power in the real-time market. The next stage, day-ahead reliability unit commitment,
occurs at 2:30 PM and does take forecasted load into account. ERCOT modifies expected generator output
for all hours of the next day so that planned generation will meet expected load at least cost while respecting
constraints placed by the transmissions grid. This reliability unit commitment process is repeated hourly
with updated ERCOT forecasts and operating plans on the part of the generation units. Under normal
circumstances, the real-time market runs every five minutes. In the real-time market ERCOT adjusts the
requested output from all generators based on changing conditions and does so to maintain system reliability
while minimizing cost. As part of minimizing generation cost, ERCOT attempts to have the outcome of the
real time market minimize the use of regulation service, where ERCOT can request changes in output within
three to five seconds to maintain appropriate frequency.
18Because of subsidies, wind generation units often submit bids with negative values.
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maximum possible output for each wind generator instead of a value reported by the wind
unit operator.
An extensive discussion of the ERCOT market arrangements with respect to wind gen-
eration can be found in Sioshansi and Hurlbut [2010].
1.4 Data
The data used in the analysis in this chapter comes from ERCOT, the EPA, Weather Un-
derground and the U.S. Census. The analysis uses data from February 22, 2011 to December
31, 2013.19,20 Focusing on this period avoids ERCOT’s institutional shift from a zonal to a
nodal market, which occurred on November 1, 2010 as well as large changes in the price of
natural gas.21
Generator output data comes from ERCOT. Generator output data from ERCOT’s real-
time (SCED) market is available at 15 minute intervals and includes the quantity of electricity
generated by and the maximum potential output of each generation unit.22 The maximum
potential output levels for wind generation units at the time the generation units are dis-
patched depend on wind conditions and are telemetered data instead of being submitted by
the wind unit operators. Quantity of electricity generated only includes power added to the
19I am missing data for some variables for a small number of days during this time period.
20This data is very similar to the data used in Chapter 2, which uses data through 2014. 2014 data is not
used in this chapter because I do not have 2014 data for some variables which are used here but not in the
second chapter.
21As seen in Figure 1.2, during the time period examined in this chapter there is little growth in installed
wind turbine capacity so observed changes in potential wind generation will be mainly due to changing
weather conditions. Note that over longer time horizons, changes in wind generation could be due to the
installation of additional wind turbines.
22The value for a generation unit’s High Sustainable Limit assumes unlimited time to reach that speed.
The amount of power that can be generated on short notice can be less than this maximum level and is
called the High Dispatchable Limit.
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grid and does not count any electricity consumed by the generator itself. This generation
data is aggregated to the ERCOT-level for analysis.
Forecasted levels of potential wind generation for upcoming hours are also available at
hourly frequency from ERCOT. ERCOT’s forecasts of potential wind generation include a
distribution of potential outcomes. The data includes values for potential wind generation
that, according to the forecast, have a 80% and 50% chance of being exceeded.
Data on hourly CO2 emissions from power generation units are obtained through the
EPA’s Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS). CEMS allows the EPA to track
compliance with emissions-related regulations.23 I use hourly emissions data for genera-
tion units within ERCOT and assume that all generation units that are affected by wind
generation in ERCOT are included.
A small number of natural gas units are missing CO2 data. I fill in these missing values
using predicted values based on the heat rate, which is also available from CEMS.24 If valid
readings are not available, EPA requires that high emissions levels be recorded as a penalty.
The Sandy Creek coal facility recorded very high and unchanging emissions rates for an
extended period of time that were clearly due to CEMS recording issues. The generation
and emissions from this unit have been dropped from the analysis.
I create a single hourly temperature measure for Texas using a population-weighted av-
erage of the 10 largest cities in ERCOT. Historical temperature data for these cities was
obtained from the Weather Underground website.25,26 The city populations were taken from
23Generation units with a capacity less than 25 MW are not required to participate in CEMS and so this
analysis omits emissions from those units.
24The R2 for the regression used in the prediction is about 0.95. Novan [Forthcoming] also uses the heat
rate to approximate CO2 emissions for units with missing data.
25The airport associated with the city was the location of the data. Some cities share an airport and in
those cases the weight for that airport’s temperature was the sum of the population of both cities.
26Some cities did not have historical temperature data for some hours. In these cases, the statewide
weighted temperature measure was calculated without those cities.
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the 2000 Census.
Pricing data for coal is at the monthly level and is the average cost of coal delivered
for electricity generation in Texas. Coal pricing data comes from the EIA’s Electric Power
Monthly. Pricing data for natural gas at the daily level and is the spot price for delivery at
the Henry Hub as reported by the EIA. Fuel costs are calculated using measures of the heat
content of fuel consumed (from CEMS) and the cost of that fuel.27
1.5 Wind Intermittency
Potential wind generation is dependent on actual wind conditions which changes over time.
Intermittency can come from both expected and unexpected changes in wind generation. As
an example, Figure 1.5 plots both the predicted and actual potential hourly wind generation
for January 1, 2012, where the prediction for potential wind generation was made one hour
earlier. The predicted potential wind generation changes over the day, ranging from over
6000 MWh to less than 2000 MWh. Additionally, the actual maximum amount of wind
generation was consistently different than the predicted value.
ERCOT’s forecast of future potential wind generation is used to help ensure the stability
of the electric grid by anticipating future changes in fossil fuel generation requirements and to
allow ERCOT to obtain those generation requirements in a low-cost manner. Furthermore,
as noted by an ERCOT representative, “with the increased percentage of the system load
served by wind, it becomes critical to have not only a good forecast of how wind will generate
during the day, but also an assessment of the level of uncertainty in that forecast.” ERCOT
27These costs are approximations to the actual price paid by the generators, which will vary across gener-
ators. For example, natural gas prices vary geographically. Furthermore, coal prices can vary depending on
the type of coal used by specific generators.
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[2010]. The short run wind forecasts used by ERCOT have improved substantially in recent
years. Figure 1.6 shows the distribution of one-hour-ahead potential wind generation forecast
errors. In all years from 2011-2013, the mean forecast error is near zero (-11.6 MWh in 2011,
-8.5 MWh in 2012 and 4.9 MWh in 2013). However, the average magnitude of the forecast
error has declined even as additional wind turbines have been installed and overall wind
generation levels increased, falling from 471.97 MWh in 2011 to 305.06 MWh in 2012 and
312.80 MWh in 2013.28
Because the generation must match total load, this wind intermittency will affect the
operations of the electric grid. An decrease in wind generation must be balanced by either
a decrease in electric load or an increase of electricity into the grid from another sources;
either some form of storage or through increased generation from fossil fuel generators. Large
scale battery storage is not financially feasible and Texas obtains a very small proportion
of its electricity come from hydropower, another form of electricity storage that Texas lacks
the necessary geography to effectively exploit.29 Demand response to maintain grid stability
is an alternative means of adjusting for changes in wind generation. While ERCOT has
worked to incorporate some load to be capable of quickly reducing their power consumption
in response to a signal, demand response has historically been used only several times per
year.30 Increased use of real-time pricing may also help, though having demand quickly
adjust to unforeseen changes in wind generation may not be as straightforward as adjusting
fossil fuel generation levels.
Adjusting the amount of fossil fuel generation in response to changes in wind generation
28Six hour ahead potential wind forecasts have not noticeably improved in terms of average magnitude of
forecast error over these three years.
29In January 2013, a 36-MW battery project was completed, however this is not a substantial size given
that the average hourly wind generation in Texas for 2013 was 3704 MWh.
30There were 21 uses of demand response between April 2006 and October 2011.
13
is an alternative. However, fossil fuel generators have different abilities to adjust output
levels; natural gas is much more flexible, with the ramping rate of combined cycle natural
gas units generally about four times that of coal units (Tremath et al. [2013]). If it becomes
more optimal from either a cost minimization or grid stability perspective to have a more
flexible mix of fossil fuel generation sources, then this could result in a shift towards using
more natural gas to meet the same level of necessary fossil fuel generation.
Figure 1.7 shows the observed mix of hourly natural gas and coal generation at different
levels of fossil fuel generation from Texas during the sample period. At any given level of
fossil fuel generation, there is a range of observed mixes of coal and natural gas generation.
Determining which mix to use in any given hour can be based on a number of factors.
Dynamic considerations are one; if a given fossil fuel generation level occurs in the middle
of the night, that would likely result in a different generation mix than if it occurred in late
afternoon because the latter would likely use more peaking generation. Plant maintenance is
another; if a coal facility is being repaired then this will likely result in increased natural gas
generation to compensate. If additional flexibility in fossil fuel output levels is preferred, this
may also result in shifting generation mix towards natural gas, as suggested in the stylized
model from Section 1.2.
While the wind power intermittency may result in a preference for more flexible fossil fuel
output levels to better adjust to future changes in potential wind generation, wind power
also directly offsets fossil fuel generation requirements, as also seen in the model from Section
1.2. Figure 1.8 illustrates these different effects: as the level of wind generation increases,
the level of fossil fuel falls, decreasing natural gas generation. If the desire for fossil fuel
output flexibility increases, however, the quantity of natural gas generation for a given level
of total fossil fuel generation increases.
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1.5.1 Electricity Generation and Emissions
Electricity generation was responsible for 32% of greenhouse gas emissions in the United
States in 2012. While generation sources such as wind, solar, geothermal or nuclear power
do not produce emissions, coal and natural gas do. Any effect of wind power on emissions
will depend on how it affects the operation of the grid. If the intermittent nature of wind
power causes a shift in the fossil fuel mix towards more flexible natural gas generation, then
this could reduce emissions because natural gas generating units are generally cleaner than
coal units. Additionally, when total fossil fuel generation is reduced in response to increased
wind generation, the resulting reduction in emissions will depend on what type of generation
unit was offset.31 Table 1.1 shows the average emissions rates for coal and natural gas
generation units in the dataset. Electricity generated from coal, on average, emits over twice
as much CO2 pollution as electricity generated from natural gas. However the cost of the
fuel consumed in natural gas generation tends to be more expensive than coal generation.
If wind intermittency changes the fossil fuel generation mix, then this would likely im-
pact emissions and fuel costs. For a given level of fossil fuel generation, emissions would
be expected to be higher when coal makes up a larger share of the fossil fuel generation.
Additionally, generators are less efficient when they are changing output levels. When fossil
fuel generators must ramp their production levels up or down to compensate for changes
in wind generation, this can reduce the efficiency of these generators and lead to increased
emissions.The magnitude of this impact as compared to shifting fossil fuel generation mix is
31Novan [Forthcoming] finds that increased wind generation results in larger emissions reductions when
total generation levels are lower and coal is more likely to be the marginal unit.
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an empirical question.
In addition to impacting emissions through intermittency, wind generation affects emis-
sions by reducing the total amount of fossil fuel generation. This effect results in a corre-
sponding decrease in emissions. Kaffine et al. [2010] and Novan [Forthcoming] find that the
effect of additional wind generation on emissions is related to the type of generation units
whose output is reduced by the wind power. Thus on average, if wind power reduces coal
power instead of non-peaker natural gas power, the effect of that increase of wind power on
emissions will on average differ substantially.32
The marginal generator can in turn depend on what the overall load is. Figure 1.7 shows
how on average the use of coal versus natural gas generation changes as the total fossil
fuel generation increases in Texas. Initially at low fossil fuel generation levels, additional
generation on average comes from both natural gas and coal generation. Once fossil fuel
generation is at about 30,000 MWh, further generation primarily comes from natural gas
plants, as can be seen by the essentially flat slope of the coal generation-net generation
relationship when net generation is high. Thus when total fossil fuel generation is high, the
effect of wind power on reducing total fossil fuel generation is likely to reduce natural gas
power.
1.6 Empirical Analysis
Using ERCOT-wide time series data, I examine how wind power intermittency affects the
fossil fuel generation mix, CO2 emissions and fuel costs. I initially test if wind generation
has an effect on electricity generation apart from simply reducing the amount of necessary
32Fell and Kaffine [2014] find that increased wind generation generally reduces coal generation capacity
factors and this effect is stronger when natural gas prices are lower.
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fossil fuel generation and find this is the case. I then test if this additional effect changes in
different situations, across electric load levels and across years, before testing the effect of
explicit wind intermittency variables. I then test the impact of wind power intermittency on
CO2 emissions and fuel costs.
1.6.1 Baseline Model
To observe the effect of wind intermittency, my baseline model estimates the average effect
of additional wind generation on the fossil fuel generation mix while controlling for the effect
of wind generation on reducing total fossil fuel generation using the following specification:
NatGasGenerationt =β1Wt + f(FossilFuelt)+
α0 + α1Tempt + α2Temp
2
t + γmHourMontht + t (1.1)
NatGasGenerationt is the amount of natural gas generation in hour t.
33 The fossil fuel
generation mix will be affected by the total amount of fossil fuel generation as seen in Figure
1.7. This is captured through the f(FossilFuelt) term, a fifth-degree orthogonalized polyno-
mial.34 The amount of required fossil fuel generation is total required electricity generation
net of generation from other fuel sources. The amount of total electricity demand is assumed
to be exogenous. Power must then be generated to meet this inflexible load. For the state of
33Note that because I control for the total level of fossil fuel generation, increasing the amount of natural
gas generation is increasing the share of natural gas generation in the fossil fuel generation mix. These results
are robust to directly using the share of natural gas in fossil fuel generation as the dependent variable, as
shown in Appendix A.
34Results are robust to using alternative degrees.
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Texas, this mainly comes from nuclear, fossil fuel and wind power.35 Nuclear power reduces
the amount of fossil fuel generation, but these generation levels do not substantially change
in the short term and are also taken to be exogenous. Wind power also reduces the required
amount of fossil fuel generation, as illustrated in Figure 1.8.36
The amount of wind power generated in hour t, Wt, reduces the amount of fossil fuel
generation, as illustrated in Figure 1.8 and this effect is captured in f(FossilFuelt). Wind
generation is allowed to have an additional effect, captured by β1. Identifying these effects
separately comes from variation in the total electric load as the wind power effect on total
fossil fuel generation is set to have the opposite effect as total electric load. If β1 is not equal
to zero, then wind generation has an additional effect on the dependent variables apart
from simply reducing the quantity of generation required from other sources. Considering
that, unlike conventional generation sources, wind power is not perfectly dispatchable and
depends on wind conditions, I will initially attribute this effect to wind intermittency. Later
specifications will include specific intermittency related variables.37
Temperature affects the efficiency of generators, with high temperatures reducing ef-
ficiency. Heterogeneous effects of temperature on efficiency across generator types could
affect the fossil fuel generation mix.
35Other power sources such as biomass, solar and hydroelectric comprise less than 1% of the generation.
36I assume that wind conditions do not affect the total load. Novan [Forthcoming] notes that most wind
generation resources are located in a different area of Texas as most electricity demand. Novan [Forthcom-
ing] further notes that the windspeed conditions on the ground are not highly correlated with windspeed
conditions at the height of the wind turbine blades.
37If β1 does represent the effect of wind power intermittency, then nuclear power (which does not produce
emissions and whose production is not dependent on weather conditions) should not have an additional
effect on the dependent variables apart from its role in reducing reducing fossil fuel generation. I separately
run this test and, as expected, find no significant effect for nuclear power apart from reducing fossil fuel
generation. However, the standard errors for the additional effect of nuclear power are several times larger
than the standard errors for the equivalent wind parameter. This is likely because of limited variation in
total nuclear generation levels, mainly driven by large jumps several times per year as opposed to substantial
within-day variation as with wind.
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HourMontht is an hourly dummy variable that varies by year-month combination m,
included to address dynamic issues. Figure 1.9 plots the average total generation and wind
generation for each hour. The top panel shows that the average need for fossil fuel generation
can change across the hours of the day.38 For the same level of total fossil fuel generation,
baseload generators (those with lower marginal costs and less flexibility) should be a larger
share of the fossil fuel generation when the total required fossil fuel generation is near a local
minimum as compared to when it is near a local maximum; hourly controls are included
to address this. Because both average total generation and average wind generation are
related to the hour and this relationship can differ across months, as seen in Figure 1.9, I
also allow the hourly fixed effects to vary across months. This specification will also control
for movement in relative fuel prices across months.
The amount of wind generation may not be exogenous. While wind speed likely is exoge-
nous, actual wind generation can be less than the maximum level allowed if grid operators
choose. This curtailment could happen for a number of reasons, most prominently transmis-
sion constraints. To address potential endogeneity issues with wind curtailment, I instrument
for ERCOT-wide wind generation using the maximum possible generation (high sustainable
limit) given current conditions for all wind generation units. This is the expected maxi-
mum potential output of wind power used by ERCOT when dispatching wind generation
resources.39,40 Note that actual wind generation is on average quite close to the high sustain-
able limit and wind curtailment drops substantially from 2011 to 2013. Appendix B tests
the importance of using an instrument for the wind generation variable and finds only minor
38Total generation in Figure 1.9 includes nuclear power, however this does not vary substantially across
hours.
39The maximum possible wind generation values in the real-time market are set by ERCOT based on
telemetered values, not on reported values from the operator of the wind generation resource. However,
maintenance decisions for wind turbines could be endogenous.
40This differs from Novan [Forthcoming] who uses a measure of wind speed as an instrument.
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differences.
To correct standard errors for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, Newey-West stan-
dard errors with 69 lags are used. The lag order was determined through the automatic
bandwidth selection procedure of Newey and West [1994].41
Table 1.2 shows selected results for this specification. After accounting for its effect in
reducing fossil fuel generation, a 1 MWh increase in wind generation is associated with a
0.034 MWh shift in the fossil fuel generation mix away from coal and toward natural gas.
1.6.2 Changes in Effect Across Load and Time
While additional wind power shifts the fossil fuel generation mix towards natural gas, this
effect may be less prominent when natural gas is already a larger portion of the generation
mix. To test if this intermittency effect falls as load gets larger, I use the following speci-
fication which allows for a different impact depending on if total generation net of nuclear
power is relatively high or low:
NatGasGenerationt =β1Wt ∗ 1[High Loadt]+
β2Wt ∗ 1[Low Loadt]+
β31[High Loadt]+
f(FossilFuelt)+
α0 + α1Tempt + α2Temp
2
t + γmHourMontht + t (1.2)
41This is also close to the 3 days worth of lags used in Kaffine et al. [2010] when studying CO2 emissions
in ERCOT.
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where the cutoff for the high or low load indicator function is having total generation net of
nuclear power above or below 30,000 MWh, approximately its mean. When generation net of
nuclear power is this high, generally there is already a larger share of natural gas generation,
as seen in Figure 1.7. Table 1.3 shows the point estimate of the wind intermittency effect on
shifting fossil fuel generation from coal to natural gas is weaker when total generation net of
nuclear power is greater than 30,000 MWh, falling from 0.048 MWh to 0.028 MWh.42
To test if the intermittency effect changes over time, potentially as experience is gained
with relatively high levels of wind penetration and wind forecast precision increases, I allow
it to differ across years as follows:
NatGasGenerationt =β1Wt ∗ 1[year = 2011]t+
β2Wt ∗ 1[year = 2012]t+
β3Wt ∗ 1[year = 2013]t+
f(FossilFuelt)+
α0 + α1Tempt + α2Temp
2
t + γmHourMontht + t (1.3)
Coefficient estimates can be found in Table 1.4. The wind intermittency effect on shifting
fossil fuel generation from coal to natural gas is strongest in 2011. A 1 MWh increase in
wind generation is associated with a shift in fossil fuel generation from coal to natural gas
of 0.075 MWh. By 2013, the same 1 MWh increase in wind generation was responsible for
a shift in fossil fuel generation from coal to natural gas of 0.021 MWh.43 To the extent that
42The difference in impact is statistically significant at the 10% level.
43The difference in the effect on natural gas generation between 2011 and 2012 is significant at the 10%
level while testing that the effect is the same in 2011 and 2013 has a p-value of 0.11.
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wind forecast precision has improved from 2011, as seen in Figure 1.6, any given level of
wind generation may be associated with lower risk of unexpected change in wind generation
in the later years, potentially contributing to the intermittency effect in 2011, β1, being
substantially larger than the other β parameters. Additional experience with higher levels
of wind generation could also be a contributing factor.
1.6.3 Explicit Intermittency Variables
In previous specifications, the effect of additional wind beyond reducing fossil fuel generation
has been interpreted as the effect of wind intermittency without indicating what feature
or features of wind generation was causing such effects, such as forecasted or unforecasted
change in wind generation. Identifying the specific features of wind intermittency responsible
for effects on fossil fuel generation mix will be important if the value of wind intermittency is
to be incorporated into policy decisions. I add a set of explicit wind intermittency variables
to do so:
NatGasGenerationt =β1Wt+
ψ[IntermittencyV arst]+
f(FossilFuelt)+
α0 + α1Tempt + α2Temp
2
t + γmHourMontht + t (1.4)
where IntermittencyVars are a vector of intermittency related variables that vary across
specifications.
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To capture the effect of expected changes in wind generation over time, I calculate the
standard deviation of wind generation over a five hour window spanning two hours before
and after hour t (for the upcoming two hours I use forecasted potential wind generation for
those hours in hour t to distinguish between expected and unexpected change.) To capture
the effect of uncertainty in wind power forecasts, I use the difference between the 20th and
50th percentiles of ERCOT’s potential wind generation forecast for the upcoming hour.
Four specifications are used with differing vectors of intermittency variables as follows:
1. No intermittency variables; reproduces results from equation 1.1 for ease of comparison
2. Standard deviation of expected wind generation (expected variation)
3. Uncertainty of wind forecast for upcoming hour (unexpected variation)
4. Standard deviation of expected wind generation (expected variation); uncertainty of
wind forecast for upcoming hour (unexpected variation)
Table 1.5 shows the coefficient estimates for these specifications. Column 1 reproduces the
results from Table 1.2. When the measure of expected variation, the standard deviation of
expected wind generation over a five hour window, is included, it shifts fossil fuel generation
from coal to natural gas, as seen in Column 2. Similarly, Column 3 shows additional uncer-
tainty in potential wind power forecasts also shifts fossil fuel generation from coal to natural
gas. Column 4 includes both types of intermittency (the standard deviation of expected
wind generation over a five hour window and the measure of wind forecast uncertainty). The
effects of both intermittency variables remain qualitatively the same, shifting natural gas
generation from coal to natural gas, although the effect of each individual variable is not as
strong as it was when the other was not included.
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1.6.4 Effect of Intermittency on Emissions and Fuel Costs
Because natural gas generation is generally both more expensive and less polluting than coal
generation, the effect of wind power intermittency on shifting fossil fuel generation from coal
to natural gas should also affect total emissions and fuel costs. Any increase in fuel costs
or decrease in emissions as a result of wind generation intermittency are costs and benefits
imposed by wind generation but the resulting value of these impacts are not borne by the
owners of wind generation units.
I directly test the effect of wind intermittency on measures of aggregate CO2 emissions
and fuel costs instead of using the fossil fuel generation mix results combined with measures
of average emissions and fuel costs across the generator types. This is because, as noted by
Kaffine et al. [2013] and Novan [Forthcoming], emissions for a given unit or type of unit is not
always at its average level and directly estimating the effect of wind generation intermittency
on emissions can account for these varying emissions levels. The same is true for the efficiency
of generation units. See Kaffine et al. [2013] or Novan [Forthcoming] for a more complete
discussion.
Initially, to estimate the effect of wind generation intermittency on fuel costs and CO2
emissions, I use the same approach as in Equation 1.1, reproduced here:
DependentV art =β1Wt + f(FossilFuelt)+
α0 + α1Tempt + α2Temp
2
t + γmHourMontht + t (1.5)
DependentV art is either CO2 emissions or fuel cost. Coefficient estimates for β1 for both
specifications are found in Table 1.6. After controlling for the effect of wind generation on
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lowering total fossil fuel generation requirements, the additional effect of wind generation
intermittency is associated with reduced overall CO2 emissions, assuming any additional
effect of wind generation is due to intermittency, though the effect on the cost of consumed
fuel is close to zero and not statistically significant.44 Considering that wind intermittency
was found to shift fossil fuel generation from coal to natural gas, an increase in fuel generation
cost may have been expected as the average fuel cost per MWh of every natural gas generator
in the sample is higher than the average fuel cost per MWh of every coal generator.
The prior analysis only looks at the same-hour effects of wind generation intermittency
on CO2 emissions and fuel costs. If wind intermittency has a dynamic impact, affecting
emissions and costs in neighboring periods, then the prior CO2 and fuel cost estimates will
be mismeasured. This could be especially true if wind generation affects the outcomes and
timing of generator startup decisions as this process consumes fuel inefficiently. I incorporate
effects across hours by allowing wind intermittency two hours before and after the current
hour to affect the current hour fuel costs and emissions:
DependentV art =
2∑
i=−2
[βiWindGent+i + f(FossilFuelt+i)] + (1.6)
α0 + α1Tempt + α2Temp
2
t + γjMonthHourt + t
The dynamic effect of wind intermittency is the sum of the βi coefficients. The coefficient
results are found in Table 1.7. Wind intermittency increases cost and decreases CO2 emis-
44Measurement error in the dependent variable arises from assuming all coal generators are paying the
statewide monthly average rate for coal and that natural gas generators are paying the daily closing price
at Henry Hub. This does not incorporate individual long term contracts, individualized transportation costs
or differences in coal price due to different coal types. This measurement error will result in less precise
estimates of the effect of wind intermittency on fuel costs.
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sions. The intermittency associated with a 1 MWh increase in wind generation is associated
with a fall of CO2 emissions of 0.0236 tons, with a value of $0.92 when using a social cost
of carbon of $39/ton. The associated increase in fuel costs is $1.38. With average wind
generation over the approximate 2011-2013 period covered by the dataset of 3464 MW per
hour, the annual increase in fuel generation costs as a result of wind intermittency is about
$42 million. However there is also an average hourly reduction of 81.75 tons of CO2 with an
annual value of about $28 million, which substantially offsets the increase in fuel generation
costs.
Cullen [2013],Kaffine et al. [2013] and Novan [Forthcoming] estimate the impact of an ad-
ditional MWh of wind generation on overall CO2 emissions in Texas. While their approaches
to this estimation do vary in their specifics, in their base specifications they each find that
additional MWh of wind generation lowers CO2 by an average of 0.523 tons (Kaffine et al.
[2013]), 0.4735 tons (Cullen [2013]) and 0.63 tons (Novan [Forthcoming]). These effects are
aggregate effects that include both any intermittency related effect as well as the more direct
effect of offsetting fossil fuel generation. Averaging the estimates from these three papers
results in an average decrease of 0.542 tons of CO2 per additional MWh of wind generation.
45
This can be compared to the effect of wind intermittency on CO2 from Table 1.7, where the
wind intermittency associated with an increase in wind generation of one MWh results in a
fall of CO2 emissions of 0.0236 tons. This indicates that the effect of wind power offsetting
fossil fuel generation is substantially larger than effects resulting from wind intermittency,
at least at the levels of wind generation observed in Texas over this time period; the inter-
mittency effect is about 4.4% of the aggregated overall effect from the earlier three papers.46
45Results from Chapter 2 of this document indicate that an additional MWh of wind generation is asso-
ciated with a decrease in CO2 emissions of 0.640 tons in 2011, which is very close to the results found in
Novan [Forthcoming].
46Note that this chapter uses data from 2011-2013, while the earlier papers use data from varying time
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Results from Chapter 2 showing that increased wind generation of 1 MWh on average re-
duces generation costs by $26.01 in 2011, indicating that offsetting fossil fuel generation does
dominate wind intermittency effects on generation cost as well.
In addition to testing the overall effect of wind intermittency on CO2 emissions and fuel
costs, I examine the effect of the explicit wind intermittency variables that measure expected
and unexpected wind power variation. Following the approach from equation 1.4, I allow the
intermittency variables from up to two hours before and after hour t to affect the current
dependent variable in order to capture effects outside the current hour such as changing
generator start-up decisions. The specification is as follows:
DependentV art =
2∑
i=−2
[βiWindGent+i + f(FossilFuelt+i)] +
2∑
i=−2
[αiStdDevOfExpectedWindGent+i] + (1.7)
2∑
i=−2
[γiUpcomingForecastUncertaintyt+i] +
α0 + α1Tempt + α2Temp
2
t + γjMonthHourt + t
where DependentV art is either CO2 emissions or fuel costs. Coefficient estimates for the
sum of βi, αi and γi can be found in Table 1.8. For fuel costs, the additional explicit inter-
mittency variables are not statistically significant and the coefficient on the ’additional wind
generation effect’ after controlling for reduced fossil fuel requirements is largely unchanged
from when the explicit intermittency variables were not included in Table 1.7. The CO2 re-
sults, however, are different. The ’additional wind generation effect’ is no longer statistically
periods spanning 2005 to 2011.
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significant though the coefficient estimate is only slightly changed from Table 1.7. However
the measure of expected wind generation variation (the standard deviation of expected wind
generation over a five hour window) is statistically significant and reduces CO2 emissions as
would be expected from a shift from coal to natural gas generation. The measure of wind
forecast uncertainty is also not statistically significant.
The estimated effect of wind generation intermittency on CO2 emissions and fuel costs
should not be seen as a comprehensive measure of positive and negative externalities imposed
by wind generation intermittency. The financial costs of electricity generation come from
a number of sources beyond the cost of consumed fuel. Capital costs of constructing the
generation units, including interest paid on any initial loan, are also costly. Usage patterns
of generators also affect maintenance costs. Newly constructed generation facilities may
also require investment in costly additional transmission capacity. Furthermore, natural gas
generation is cleaner than coal generation in more ways than just reduced CO2 emissions.
Natural gas generation also generally results in less NOx, SO2 and particulate matter pol-
lution. The estimated value of CO2 emissions reduction and increased fuel costs are lower
bounds of both costs and benefits of wind intermittency. For example, engineering estimates
suggest that wind generation intermittency will have a financial cost of around $2 to $6 per
MWh of wind generation (Albadi and El-Saadany [2010]).
1.7 Conclusion
Wind power intermittency imposes a financial cost on electricity generation. However this in-
termittency also provides an environmental benefit which should also be accounted for when
determining the social impacts of wind generation. On average, wind generation intermit-
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tency is associated with increased natural gas generation and reduced coal power. Because
natural gas generation is cleaner but more expensive than coal generation, this intermittency-
induced shift reduces the emissions resulting from electricity generation but increases fuel
costs. The fall in CO2 emissions suggests this shifting effect dominates any generator-level
increased inefficiency due to ramping production levels to accommodate wind intermittency.
Using the U.S. social cost of carbon of $39/ton, the average effect of wind intermittency
from a 1 MWh increase in wind generation is associated with a reduction in CO2 emissions
valued at $0.92, not including the value of any emissions reductions apart from CO2. This
value is smaller than the estimated increase in fuel costs of $1.38 as well as engineering
estimates of the overall financial costs of wind intermittency of around $2 to $6 per MWh
of wind generation but nevertheless indicates a substantial fraction of those financial costs
would be offset by environmental benefits. If the social cost of carbon is underestimated due
to unmeasurable effects, as suggested by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
report (IPCC [2007]), then these environmental benefits from wind intermittency will be
further understated as well.
The impact of intermittency on emissions reduction is relevant for subsidy policy. While
subsidizing each MWh of wind power based on its associated emissions reduction would be
ideal, this is not a practical solution. However, connecting the subsidy payments for each
wind turbine in part to its expected or actual contribution to total wind power intermittency
could be feasible; an additional wind turbine will contribute to the overall variation in wind
generation based on how its output is correlated with other wind turbines. Incorporating
this when setting subsidy levels would encourage any effect on variation in wind generation
to be incorporated into siting decisions for new wind turbines and more accurately align the
impact of additional wind turbines on emissions with the subsidy payment. Similarly, any
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subsidy payment related to wind intermittency could reflect the fossil fuel generation mix in
the region. While it may be beneficial to lock in a methodology to calculate subsidy payments
before turbine is built to simplify financing concerns (compared to other generation sources,
the cost of wind generation is effectively all up-front when building the turbine), changes in
the social cost of wind generation intermittency over time would ideally be incorporated as
well. Most significantly, when determining the social costs of wind intermittency, the impact
of intermittency on both generation costs and emissions reduction should be considered.
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Figure 1.1: Boundaries of ERCOT Region
Source: ERCOT
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Figure 1.2: Wind Generation Capacity in ERCOT
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Figure 1.3: Monthly Average Hourly Wind Generation in ERCOT
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Figure 1.4: NERC Interconnections
Source: NERC
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Figure 1.5: Predicted vs. Actual Wind Generation in ERCOT
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of Wind Forecast Error By Year
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Figure 1.7: Generation By Type vs. Non-Nuclear, Non-Wind Generation
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Figure 1.8: Illustration of Potential Effects of Increasing Wind Power on Natural Gas Gen-
eration
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Figure 1.9: Generation By Hour
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Table 1.1: Emissions and Generation Cost By Fuel Source
Coal Natural Gas
Average CO2 Emissions (tons/MWh) 1.19 0.53
Average Fuel Cost ($/MWh) 21.42 30.75
Average Max Generation (MW) 632 201
Average maximum generation is the average of the highest observed output for each generation unit. Average
fuel cost and CO2 emissions is the ratio of total CO2 and total fuel cost to total generation by fuel type.
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Table 1.2: Effect of Wind Intermittency on Fossil Fuel Generation Mix
(1)
VARIABLES Nat Gas Generation
Wind Gen 0.0336*
(0.0176)
f(Fossil Fuel Gen) X
Observations 23,665
Observations are hourly and aggregated to ERCOT-level. Data is from approximately 2011-2013. Newey-
West standard errors with 69 lags used to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Potential
wind generation is used to instrument for actual wind generation. Coefficients for temperature, hour-month
indicator variables and nonlinear controls for generation net of nuclear and wind power are omitted. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.3: Effect of Wind Intermittency on Fossil Fuel Generation Mix - By Load Level
(1)
VARIABLES Nat Gas Generation
Wind Gen (High Load) 0.0282
(0.0178)
Wind Gen (Low Load) 0.0483**
(0.0189)
High Load Indicator 29.94
(58.67)
f(Fossil Fuel Gen) X
Observations 23,665
Observations are hourly and aggregated to ERCOT-level. Data is from approximately 2011-2013. Newey-
West standard errors with 69 lags used to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Potential
wind generation is used to instrument for actual wind generation. Coefficients for temperature, hour-month
indicator variables and nonlinear controls for generation net of nuclear and wind power are omitted. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.4: Effect of Wind Intermittency on Fossil Fuel Generation Mix - By Year
(1)
VARIABLES Nat Gas Generation
Wind Gen (2011) 0.0751***
(0.0235)
Wind Gen (2012) 0.0215
(0.0238)
Wind Gen (2013) 0.0209
(0.0286)
f(Fossil Fuel Gen) X
Observations 23,665
Observations are hourly and aggregated to ERCOT-level. Data is from approximately 2011-2013. Newey-
West standard errors with 69 lags used to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Potential
wind generation is used to instrument for actual wind generation. Coefficients for temperature, hour-month
indicator variables and nonlinear controls for generation net of nuclear and wind power are omitted. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Static Effect of Wind Intermittency on Generation Costs and Emissions
(1) (2)
VARIABLES CO2 Generation Cost
Wind Gen -0.0551*** -0.00501
(0.0118) (0.575)
f(Fossil Fuel Gen) X X
Observations 23,665 23,665
Observations are hourly and aggregated to ERCOT-level. Data is from approximately 2011-2013. Newey-
West standard errors with 69 lags used to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Potential
wind generation is used to instrument for actual wind generation. Coefficients for temperature, hour-month
indicator variables and nonlinear controls for generation net of nuclear and wind power are omitted. NG
and Coal results do not sum to ”total” results due to a small number of other generation units. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Dynamic Effect of Wind Intermittency on Generation Costs and Emissions
(1) (2)
VARIABLES CO2 Generation Cost
Dynamic Wind Gen -0.0236* 1.38**
[0.070] [0.0301]
f(Fossil Fuel Gen) X X
Observations 23,665 23,665
Observations are hourly and aggregated to ERCOT-level. Dynamic effects include impacts over a five hour
window. Data is from approximately 2011-2013. Newey-West standard errors with 69 lags used to correct
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Potential wind generation is used to instrument for actual
wind generation. Coefficients for temperature, hour-month indicator variables and nonlinear controls for
generation net of nuclear and wind power are omitted. NG and Coal results do not sum to ”total” results due
to a small number of other generation units. P-value for F-test of summed effect in brackets. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: Dynamic Effect of Detailed Wind Intermittency Variables on Generation Cost
and Emissions
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Generation Cost CO2
Dynamic Wind Gen 1.44* -0.021
[0.054] [0.162]
Dynamic Std Dev of Expected Wind Gen (5 Hr Window) 0.179 -0.215***
[0.846] [0.002]
Dynamic Forecast Uncertainty -1.63 0.0685
[0.951] [0.652]
f(Fossil Fuel Gen) X X
Observations 23,665 23,665
Observations are hourly and aggregated to ERCOT-level. Dynamic effects include impacts over a five hour
window. Data is from approximately 2011-2013. Newey-West standard errors with 69 lags used to correct for
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. ”Std Dev of Expected Wind Gen (5 Hr Window)”measures expected
variance in wind generation. ”Forecast Uncertainty” is the difference between the 20th and 50th percentile
of predicted potential wind generation outcomes in the following hour. Coefficients for temperature, hour-
month indicator variables and nonlinear controls for generation net of nuclear and wind power are omitted.
P-value for F-test of summed effect in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER II
Valuing Transmission and Curtailment of Wind
Generation
2.1 Introduction
Wind generation has expanded dramatically in Texas over the past 15 years. Much of this
generation capacity was installed in remote areas in the western part of the state because of
more favorable wind conditions. As the number of turbines in this area increased, the amount
of wind power curtailment – not generating wind power that could have been generated based
on weather conditions – increased as well because of the inability of the transmission grid to
move all of the potential wind power to the more populated areas of the state where most of
the electricity demand was. This wind power curtailment meant that the forfeited electricity
must instead be generated from a source with higher marginal cost such as coal or natural
gas. In 2011, Texas curtailed over 5% of its potential wind generation with wind curtailment
potentially becoming an increasingly large issue as the number of wind turbines continued
to grow.
Recognizing early on that the locations with this highest quality wind conditions for wind
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power generation were in remote areas, the Public Utilities Commission of Texas (PUCT)
initiated a project in 2008 to increase transmission capacity to take greater advantage of
the wind generation potential. The resulting expansion of transmission capacity substan-
tially reduced the amount of wind generation curtailment; by 2013 curtailment was down
to well under 0.5% of potential wind generation even as the number of wind turbines and
the amount of the resulting wind generation continued to increase. However after running
over the initial forecasted budget, the final cost of this transmission expansion was around
$7 billion, essentially a large fixed cost that was paid in order to better access the selected
wind resources.
This chapter compares estimates of the financial and environmental benefits of this trans-
mission expansion to its costs. While accessing additional wind power, with its absence of
fuel costs and air pollution, has clear benefits, how much of the value of the recent Texas
expansion was consumed by the cost of transmission? To do so I estimate the impact of
additional wind generation on generation cost and CO2 emissions from before the transmis-
sion expansion. I then use data from after the expansion to obtain a counterfactual level
of wind generation. I find this additional generation falls far short of the amount of wind
generation necessary to generate enough value to justify the transmission expansion, which
is unsurprising given that allowing for more effective use of additional wind turbines was the
main purpose of the transmission expansion. I then estimate the amount of additional wind
generation that would be necessary to justify the cost of expanded transmission.
Ultimately if the expanded transmission capacity is fully used by wind generation, under
some conservative assumptions, I find that between about 2.5-11.2% of the additional value
will be consumed by the cost of the transmission expansion. As transmission expansion was
not immediately fully used (the current record for peak wind generation is around 60% of the
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capacity of the transmission expansion) the true cost of transmission is non-trivially higher.
While the low-marginal cost nature of wind generation is attractive, the fixed costs of
installation can be large. Additionally, the costs of transmission capacity to move the elec-
tricity to the areas where it is needed can be nontrivial and should be considered part of
the overall costs of generation. This can be a larger issue for wind generation as opposed
to other power sources that do not depend on weather conditions and can be located closer
to the areas where it is demanded, lowering the necessary transmission costs. While wind
generation can be constructed anywhere, the financial viability of any specific wind turbine
project depends on the average weather conditions allowing sufficient generation to pay for
the turbine. Incorporating any necessary transmission cost into this benefit-cost analysis
may result in regions with less ideal wind conditions but lesser transmission requirements
being preferable to remote regions with excellent weather conditions for wind generation.
Incorporating the cost of transmission into the financial incentives for the entity making the
siting decisions for wind turbines could improve overall welfare.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Wind Generation in Texas and CREZ Construction
The amount of electricity that can be generated by wind depends on the wind conditions.
As the cost of wind generation is essentially the construction and installation of the turbine,
with little operating costs later, from the perspective of the turbine owners, it is most cost
effective to place these turbines in areas with high average wind speed. Often these places are
geographically remote; across the United States as a whole, the middle region of the country
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stands out as being a particularly fruitful place for wind generation (2.1). In Texas, the best
locations for wind turbine construction, in terms of their potential wind energy generation,
are in the western part of the state. However this area is not close to the major urban areas
of the state and initially there was limited transmission capacity to move electricity out of
this area.
In the mid-2000s, as wind generation capacity was dramatically increasing with increas-
ing numbers of wind turbines being installed (Figure 1.2), the Texas government began to
look at ways to upgrade the transmission grid to best take advantage of the natural wind
resources in the western part of the state. Texas Senate Bill 20, in 2005, required the Public
Utilities Commission of Texas (PUCT) to identify Competitive Renewable Energy Zones
(CREZ) where wind generation potential was high and where transmission capacity would
be upgraded. In 2008, the PUCT declared five regions as CREZ (Figure 2.2). Initial con-
struction on the transmission expansion began around 2010 and was essentially completed
by the end of 2013 at a cost of $6.9 billion (Figure 2.3).47,48
Over 3,589 miles of new 345 kV transmission lines were part of this project, with a
capacity of about 18,500 MW. To reach this level of wind generation would require substantial
additional wind turbines; the current instantaneous wind production record in Texas is 10,957
MW and was set on December 25, 2014.
Interested readers should refer to the final CREZ progress report for additional details
(RS&H [2014]).
During the period between when the CREZ project was started and when sections of
additional transmission began coming online, wind generation capacity continued to grow
47One project (out of 169) is expected to be completed by December 2015.
48The initial predicted cost was $5.0 billion for 2,963 miles of transmission. For simplicity, this early
estimate assumed that the transmission lines would be straight, however in practice this did not turn out to
be the case, leading to increases in required transmission lines and cost.
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(Figure 1.2). Wind curtailment, due to transmission constraints, became more common.49
Additionally spot prices for electricity in the western part of the state were often negative
when this transmission congestion occurred. This was because the federal Production Tax
Credit paid wind turbine owners based on their output and so wind turbine operators could
profitably submit negative bids. During periods of transmission congestion, the marginal
generator in the western part of the state could be wind.
The top panel in Figure 2.4 shows that in 2011, wind generation curtailment was sub-
stantial at higher levels of potential wind generation. Once the CREZ projects began to be
completed, transmission constraints were reduced and occurrences of wind curtailment and
negative spot prices in the western part of the state became more infrequent (Figure 2.6).
In 2014, after the completion of the CREZ expansion, wind generation curtailment became
trivial, even at the highest observed levels of potential wind generation, as seen in the bottom
panel of Figure 2.4.50
2.2.2 Related Literature
Other researchers have studied the importance of transmission. The closest paper is Davis
and Hausman [2014], who look empirically at the impact of the unexpected closure of the
SONGS nuclear generating facility in California that was located between Los Angeles and
San Diego. In addition to needing to replace the missing nuclear generation with higher
marginal cost sources, transmission constraints imposed an additional cost because higher
marginal cost generation in the southern part of the state needed to be used in place of lower-
marginal cost generation in the north. This out-of-merit-order generation due to transmission
49Appendix C discusses some evidence of minor wind power curtailment due to the exercise of market
power.
50The total transmission capacity of the CREZ lines is approximately 18,500 MW, substantially higher
than the potential wind generation in any hour in 2014.
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constraints raised the cost of energy by an average of $4,500 per hour.51 Other papers have
studied electricity transmission from a theoretical perspective, such as Joskow and Tirole
[2000], Bushnell [1999], Ryan [2013], Borenstein et al. [2000] and Wolak [2012]
In the specific case of the CREZ transmission expansion in Texas, the stated purpose
was to allow for greater access to areas with high wind generation potential. Thus much
of the value of the CREZ project would be expected to come from greater access to this
low-marginal cost resource. In addition to being less expensive with regards to marginal
cost than fossil fuel generation, wind generation also does not create air pollution such as
CO2. Other papers that have empirically studied the value of wind generation on reducing
emissions include Callaway and Fowlie [2009], Cullen [2013], Novan [Forthcoming], Kaffine
et al. [2013] (as well as the working paper version that looks at MISO and CAISO in addition
to Texas, Kaffine et al. [2010]), in addition to Chapter 1 of this text.
2.3 Model of Optimal Transmission Capacity
To illustrate the value of additional transmission capacity and optimal decisions regarding
transmission installation, I use a stylized model of the electric grid. This model is intended
to capture a feature of the Texas electricity situation, where a remote area has excellent wind
generation but little demand or other sources of power.
Assume there are two regions, A and B. Region A has the ability to generate an exoge-
nously determined amount of wind power in any hour, WAt , but does not have any other
generation capacity or electricity load. The amount of potential wind generation in any hour
is given by f(WA), which is bounded from above by the maximum capacity of all installed
51This was about 7% of the total increase in generation cost from shutting the SONGS facility down.
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wind turbines in the region, MaxWind. Region B has an inelastic demand for electricity,
LB and fossil fuel generation capacity GB,Capacity. GB,Capacity is assumed to be equal to or
larger than LB so the demand for electricity can be met without any wind generation. For
simplicity, region B does not have any wind generation capacity. Assume that LB is larger
than the maximum potential wind generation in region A.
The marginal cost of generating electricity through fossil fuels is increasing with the level
of fossil fuel generation: c′(GBt ) > 0, where G
B
t is the amount of electricity generated through
fossil fuels in time period t. Assume that this cost function incorporates both financial cost
and the impact of any resulting environmental pollution. Generating electricity through
wind generation has zero marginal cost.
Assume that there are transmission constraints between regions A and B, so that the most
electricity that can be sent from region A to region B is T. The cost minimizing solution
to have total generation equal to total load is to use as much (zero marginal cost) wind
generation as possible and generate the rest with fossil fuels. This leads to a fossil fuel
generation decision of GBt = L
B −min (WAt , T).
Increasing the transmission capacity T decreases the amount of required fossil fuel gen-
eration if the transmission constraint is binding and does nothing otherwise. This expansion
changes the generation and environmental costs by
∂c(LB−min(WAt ,T))
∂T
, which is either negative
if the transmission constraints bind and zero otherwise. The expected cost savings in a single
period of expanding transmission capacity would then be
´MaxWind
0
(
∂c(LB−min(WAt ,T))
∂T
)
f(WAt )dW
A
t . Over an infinite number of periods with discount
value δ, and assuming that the value of transmission in each period is the expected value,
the present value of an additional unit of transmission capacity would be
´MaxWind
0
(
∂c(LB−min(WAt ,T))
∂T
)
f(WAt )dW
A
t
δ
.
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When deciding whether to construction additional transmission capacity, it will be opti-
mal to expand transmission as long as the marginal cost of additional transmission, assumed
here to be an infinitely lived resource, is less than the present discounted value of the financial
and environmental cost savings. This cutoff could easily be reached before the transmission
capacity is equal to the maximum wind generation, so that the optimal level of wind curtail-
ment could be positive.
2.4 Data
The data used in this chapter is very similar to that of Chapter 1, with the key addition being
data from 2014.52 The analysis uses data for Texas from February 22, 2011 to December 31,
2014.53 Data for this project comes from ERCOT, the EPA, Weather Underground and the
U.S. Census.
Generator output data comes from ERCOT. Generator output data from ERCOT’s real-
time market is available at 15 minute intervals and includes the quantity of electricity gener-
ated by and the maximum potential output of each generation unit given its current output
and ability to change output levels within a short amount of time.54 The maximum poten-
tial output levels for wind generation units at the time the generation units are dispatched
depend on wind conditions and are telemetered data instead of being submitted by the wind
unit operators. Quantity of electricity generated only includes power added to the grid and
does not count any electricity consumed by the generator itself.
Data on hourly CO2 emissions from power generation units within ERCOT are obtained
52I do not have 2014 data for some variables used in Chapter 1 (all of the wind forecast error variables)
so that year is omitted from the Chapter 1 analysis.
53I am missing data for a small number of days during this time period.
54This is called the High Dispatchable Limit.
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through the EPA’s Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS). CEMS allows the
EPA to track compliance with emissions-related regulations.55 See Section 1.4 for details.
I create a single hourly temperature measure for Texas using a population-weighted av-
erage of the 10 largest cities in ERCOT. Again, see Section 1.4 for details.
Pricing data for coal is at the monthly level and is the average cost of coal delivered
for electricity generation in Texas. Coal pricing data comes from the EIA’s Electric Power
Monthly. Pricing data for natural gas at the daily level and is the spot price for delivery
at the Henry Hub as reported by the EIA. Fuel costs are calculated using measures of the
heat content of fuel consumed (from CEMS) and the cost of that fuel. These costs are
approximations to the actual price paid by the generators, which will vary across generators.
For example, natural gas prices vary geographically and coal prices can vary depending on
the type of coal used by specific generators.
2.5 Costs of Additional Transmission
While the construction of the CREZ transmission lines allowed for a reduction in generation
costs, the expense involved could represent a non-trivial amount of those savings. After cost
overruns of about $2 billion, the final cost of the CREZ transmission lines was $6.9 billion.
In addition to the construction costs, these power lines must be maintained. KEMA [2012]
notes that operations and maintenance costs account for about 1% of the costs of a typical
345 kV transmission line. Applying this approximation to the initial cost results in a lifetime
cost of approximately $6.969 billion.
The annual savings that would justify such an expense in present value terms can be found
55Generation units with a capacity less than 25 MW are not required to participate in CEMS and so this
analysis omits emissions from those units.
56
by solving for V in 6, 969, 000, 000 =
∑T
y=1
V
(1+δ)y
, where T is the lifespan of the transmission
lines and assuming the value of the payments were received at the end of each year. I use
two discount values in this calculation: 3% and 7%. These values were chosen because they
are the values used by the U.S. government in benefit-cost analyses as required in the Office
of Management and Budget’s Circular A-4 (OMB [2003]).56 Following KEMA [2012], I set
a lifespan for the transmission lines of 40 years. With a discount rate of 3%, the amount
of annual benefits needed to justify the CREZ construction is $301,495,511; with a discount
rate of 7% this value is $522,738,688.
2.6 Estimating Benefits of Additional Transmission
To estimate the financial and environmental value of additional transmission that reduces
wind power curtailment, I construct a counterfactual level of 2011 wind generation and
curtailment as if the CREZ transmission lines had been completed. I measure the impact
of additional wind generation on both generation costs and CO2 emissions to place a dollar
value on the counterfactual additional wind permitted by the new transmission lines. I then
estimate how much additional wind generation beyond the curtailment reduction will be
necessary on average to justify the large costs of the CREZ transmission lines.
56OMB selected 7% as an historical average pre-tax rate of return on private investment. Alternatively,
3% is their value for consumption discounting.
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2.6.1 Estimating Counterfactual Wind Generation With Trans-
mission Expansion
The CREZ expansion of transmission lines to allow for additional wind generation from the
western part of Texas was essentially completed in 2013. Compared to 2011 wind generation,
after the completion of the new transmission lines, wind generation curtailment was sharply
reduced, though not eliminated entirely as seen in the lower panel of Figure 2.4. To obtain
a counterfactual estimate of the amount of hourly wind generation in 2011 that would have
occurred with the expanded transmission grid, I estimate the relationship between potential
wind generation and actual wind generation in 2014, when the expansion of the transmission
grid was complete. Potential wind generation is allowed to affect wind generation in a
quadratic manner because curtailment is more likely to occur at higher levels of potential
wind generation due to transmission constraints or other reasons.
WindGent =β0 + β1PotentialWindGent + β2PotentialWindGen
2
t + t (2.8)
Both potential wind generation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The estimated relationship between potential and actual wind generation in 2014 is illus-
trated in the top panel of Figure 2.7 while the lower panel shows the 2014 relationship between
potential wind generation and wind generation curtailment. Wind generation curtailment
does increase as potential wind generation rises, however even at the highest observed levels
of wind generation in 2014, the expected wind curtailment is around 1%.57 The 95% confi-
57Note that this estimated relationship only uses 2014 data and caution should be used if applying this
relationship to predict wind generation when potential wind generation is substantially outside the observed
sample.
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dence interval for the predicted wind generation is sufficiently tight as to not be observable
in the upper panel of the figure.
Figure 2.5 shows the monthly average actual and counterfactual (“with completed CREZ
lines”) wind generation. Potential wind generation is not included on the figure; were it
to be included it would essentially overlap the “counterfactual wind generation” line. The
counterfactual wind generation in 2011 is notably larger than the actual wind generation; as
the date gets closer to 2014 and CREZ transmission lines become active, these lines converge.
2.6.2 Value of Reduction In Wind Curtailment From Additional
Transmission
To determine the value of of the reduced wind power curtailment caused by the addition
of the CREZ transmission lines, I estimate the value of additional wind power on reducing
generation costs and CO2 pollution. I then determine the value of counterfactual reduced
wind curtailment in 2011.
Average Value of Wind Generation and Impact of Curtailments
To calculate the value of additional wind generation and the effect of wind curtailment on
the costs of generating a given quantity of fossil fuels, I estimate the following specification
using data from 2011:
CO2t or GenCostt =β1WindGent + f(TotalGent −Nucleart)+
+ β6Tempt + β7Temp
2
t +HrMonthY eart + t (2.9)
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where the dependent variable is either hourly fossil fuel generation cost or CO2 emis-
sions.58 The coefficient on the WindGent parameter captures the average effect of an ad-
ditional MWh of wind generation on the dependent variable and is expected to lower both
CO2 and generation costs by replacing fossil fuel generation with zero marginal cost, zero
emissions wind generation. The total generation net of nuclear generation (both of which
are assumed to be exogenous) is included as a fifth-degree orthogonalized polynomial in
order to flexibly capture increasing cost and CO2 emissions as the amount of non-nuclear
generation increases. This measure is net of nuclear generation because nuclear generators
have high output capacity, very low marginal cost and generally do not adjust output levels
with generation levels, instead running at high output levels unless they are shut down for
maintenance. Thus not adjusting total generation in the specification for the amount of
nuclear generation would model periods with the same overall load that do and do not have
a substantial amount of nuclear generation as having the same cost and CO2 emissions.
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Higher temperatures are associated with reduced generator efficiency which would be
expected to lead to increased generation cost and emissions and are also correlated with
wind generation. The temperature variables are included to flexibly capture this effect.
Dummy variables for each hour-month-year combination are included to address dynamic
issues. Figure 1.9 plots the average total generation and wind generation for each hour in
both September and March for 2011-2013. These show that the average need for fossil fuel
generation can change across the hours of the day. For the same level of total generation,
58Note that increasing wind generation and offsetting fossil fuel generation will result in the reduction
of more pollutants than just CO2, such as NOx, SO2 and particulate matter pollution. The analysis in
this chapter does not incorporate the value of reducing these emissions. Incorporating their value would, if
reduction in pollutants are valued by policymakers, make the the costs of the CREZ transmission expansion a
smaller part of the overall value of the permitted wind generation and would reduce the amount of additional
wind generation necessary to create enough value to cover the costs of construction.
59Nuclear power represents about 10% of the electricity generation in Texas.
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baseload generators should be a larger share of the generation when the total generation is
near a local minimum as compared to when it is near a local maximum with correspond-
ing effects on generation cost and CO2 emissions; hourly controls are included to address
this. Because both average total generation and average wind generation are related to the
hour and this relationship can differ across months, I also allow the hourly fixed effects to
vary across months. Newey-West standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation and include 53 lags.60
When wind generation is being heavily curtailed, this is likely due to transmission con-
straints.61 This constraint implies that it will be necessary to operate the grid in a manner
that is less cost-minimizing than would otherwise be the case, such as by substituting more
expensive fossil fuel generation for wind generation. Results indicating that non-wind gener-
ation out-of-merit order effects due to transmission constraints are generally not statistically
significant and are of small magnitude are available upon request.
Coefficient estimates are found in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, for the dependent variables of gen-
eration cost and CO2 emissions, respectively. As expected, because wind generation offsets
fossil fuel generation, additional wind generation reduces both the overall costs of generation
and CO2 emissions. On average, a 1 MWh increase in wind generation is associated with a
decrease in generation costs of $26.01 and a decrease in CO2 emissions of 0.640 tons. Based
on a social cost of carbon of $39/ton, this decrease in CO2 emissions has a value of $24.96.
60This number of lags was selected using an automatic bandwidth selector. This result is about 75% of
the 72 lags used in a similar regression in Kaffine et al. [2010].
61See Appendix C for a brief discussion of evidence of market power based wind curtailment.
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Valuation of 2011 Counterfactual Reduced Wind Curtailment Due To Transmis-
sion Expansion
I calculate a counterfactual wind generation for 2011 using the potential wind generation
from 2011 with the relationship between potential and actual wind generation in 2014, after
the completion of the CREZ transmission lines, as estimated in Specification 2.8. I can then
estimate counterfactual generation cost and CO2 emissions that would have occurred in 2011
if the CREZ transmission lines had been in place using the results from the prior section.
Column 1 of Table 2.11 shows the actual fossil fuel generation costs and CO2 emissions in
2011. Column 2 shows the generation cost and CO2 emissions when using the counterfactual
2011 wind generation as if the CREZ project was already complete. Column 3 shows a
separate counterfactual generation cost and CO2 emissions when there is no wind power
curtailment at all.
Comparing Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.11 shows that having completed the CREZ
transmission expansion would have reduced hourly generation costs in 2011 by an average
of $5577 and CO2 emissions by 137 tons. Using a social cost of carbon of $39/ton, this CO2
savings would be valued at $5343. The differences in value between Columns 2 and 3 – the
additional savings in generation cost and CO2 emissions if wind curtailment was brought to
zero – are not large, about $300/hour in value each. Arranging the electric grid to prevent
any wind curtailment at all would almost surely not be cost effective, as noted in the model
in Section 2.3.
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2.7 Comparing Costs and Benefits of CREZ Transmis-
sion in Texas
From Section 2.5, the annual benefits needed to justify the CREZ construction is $301,495,511
using a discount rate of 3%; with a discount rate of 7% this value is $522,738,688. This
additional transmission capacity allowed for a reduction in transmission constraints and
essentially ended wind power curtailment at the current levels of wind generation, with a
corresponding reduction in generation costs and emissions.
Table 2.12 notes that had the CREZ expansion been in place, 2011 generation costs would
be reduced by $48,854,520 annually based on the reduced curtailment of wind generation (at
an average rate of $5577/hour). Similarly, using a social cost of carbon of $39/ton, the re-
duced CO2 from the transmission expansion has an annual value of $46,892,280 ($5353/hour);
if CO2 savings are counted then the total annual value from reduced curtailment is $95,746,800.
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However, considering that Texas bears all of cost of the transmission lines and gets only a
fraction of the (global) benefit from CO2 reduction, policymakers may wish to value the
CREZ transmission lines simply in terms of the financial savings and not count any pollu-
tion reduction. Assuming this value of reduced curtailment in 2011 is constant over time,
regardless of which discount factor is chosen or whether reductions in CO2 emissions are val-
ued at $39/ton or zero, the reduction in curtailment produces far too little value to justify
the construction of the CREZ transmission lines. This is not unexpected, as the capacity of
the CREZ transmission lines substantially exceeds the current levels of wind generation.
Assuming that the value of additional uncurtailed wind generation is the same in the
future as in 2011, for every increase in wind generation of 1 MWh in every hour, the annual
62Note that the minor difference in hourly savings from CO2 emissions reduction between here and the
prior section is due to rounding differences.
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value of this additional wind generation is $446,497 if CO2 is valued at $39/ton and $227,847
if CO2 impacts are not valued. Thus the additional wind generation each hour necessary
to provide enough annual value to offset the construction of the CREZ transmission lines
ranges from 461 to 2080 MWh, depending on the chosen discount rate and if CO2 savings
are counted. See Table 2.12 for details.63 Note that until this additional wind generation
is achieved, all of the value from the additional wind generation can be thought of as go-
ing towards paying for the additional transmission lines and not reducing generation costs,
covering the cost of wind subsidies such as the Production Tax Credit or the construction
of the turbines themselves. Also note average potential wind generation has increased from
2011 to 2014, rising from 3509 MWh to 3954 MWh.64 However it is not clear what the
counterfactual increase in potential wind generation over this time period would have been
had the CREZ project not been undertaken; determining how much of this increase in wind
generation is due to the CREZ transmission project is beyond the scope of this chapter.
The additional capacity of the CREZ transmission lines is 18,500 MW. Assuming this
capacity was immediately fully used (note that this was not the case; average hourly wind
generation in 2014 was 655MWh higher than in 2011) then about 2.5 to 11.2% of the value
of the additional wind generation would be consumed by the construction costs of the trans-
mission lines. Delays in obtaining the additional wind generation would reduce the overall
benefit of this investment in transmission in an environment with a non-zero discount value.
Additionally, not fully using the capacity of the CREZ lines will also lead to the fixed
costs of transmission installation capturing a greater portion of the value of the additional
wind generation. Because of the variability of wind generation, substantial underuse of the
63This calculation, based on the present value calculation in Section 2.5, assumes that the additional wind
generation begins immediately and is not phased in over time.
64Examining increases in potential wind generation avoids incorporating reductions in wind curtailment.
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CREZ transmission lines at some points of the day are very likely as wind turbines that will
face substantial production curtailment are not likely to be financially viable.
Generation cost savings do depend on the cost of the fossil fuels that are no longer
consumed; the above analysis uses the cost of coal and natural gas for 2011. Should input
costs change, then the benefits resulting from CREZ transmission expansion will change as
well. Figure 2.8 shows historical natural gas spot prices at Henry Hub; 2011 is after the
large fall in natural gas prices; overall the prices in that year do not appear to be abnormal,
even if only compared to more recent years after the spread of fracking. Additionally, this
analysis assumes that mix of fossil fuel generators will not change in the future; low natural
gas prices or government policies that disproportionately increase the price of coal generation
could cause power that is now generated from coal could switch to natural gas, with impacts
on generation costs and CO2 emissions. Linn et al. [2015] does find that changes in natural
gas prices did not have a statistically significant impact on the short run use of natural gas
generation in Texas.
2.8 Conclusion
While wind generation does not create air pollution and does not consume costly fossil fuel
to operate, areas particularly suited for wind generation are often in remote regions. In order
to move the electricity to more populated areas, expensive transmission must be constructed.
The cost of this transmission can consume a non-trivial amount of the value created by the
wind turbines, essentially adding to the fixed costs of wind generation. While transmission
costs are idiosyncratic to the particular projects being examined, this chapter examines the
cost effectiveness of the CREZ transmission project in Texas and finds if the additional
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CREZ capacity was immediately fully used (which it was not), transmission construction
costs would have consumed around 2.5-11.2% of the value of wind generation. Delayed
installation of additional wind turbines and less than full use of the capacity will increase
the proportion of value consumed by transmission costs, likely by substantial amounts.
When projecting costs and benefits of transmission and wind generation projects in the
planning stage, more realistic projections for transmission costs would allow a more credible
cost-benefit analysis. For example, either not using “straight-line” transmission line assump-
tions or factoring in a generous cost penalty for doing so would reduce the likelihood of actual
transmission construction costs being about 40% over initial estimates. Including accurate
estimates of the required transmission costs may make remote but windy areas less attrac-
tive than regions with inferior wind characteristics that are closer to areas with high demand
and with a lower transmission cost. As transmission lines are not free, more generally, when
determining the cost-competitiveness of a given generation project, required transmission
costs should be incorporated for a more complete measure. This could make wind projects
relatively less attractive as compared to other generation sources that have more flexibility
regarding siting locations.
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Figure 2.1: Wind Speed Across The U.S.
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Figure 2.2: CREZ Zones
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Figure 2.3: Installation of CREZ Transmission Lines
October 2012
April 2013
April 2014
Source: PUCT
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Figure 2.4: Hourly Potential Wind Generation vs. Curtailment in 2011 and 2014
70
Figure 2.5: Actual vs Counterfactual Wind Generation By Month
Counterfactual wind generation is based on the relationship between potential and actual
wind generation from 2014
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Figure 2.6: Wind Curtailments and Occurrences of Negative Spot Prices in ERCOT Over
Time
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Figure 2.7: Estimated Relationship Between Potential and Actual Wind Generation in 2014
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Figure 2.8: Historical Natural Gas Prices
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Table 2.9: Average Effect of Wind Generation on Generation Cost in 2011
(1)
VARIABLES Generation Cost
Wind Generation -26.01***
(0.990)
f(Generation-Nuclear) X
Observations 7,509
Observations are hourly and aggregated to ERCOT-level. Data is from 2011. Newey-West standard errors
with 53 lags used to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Coefficients for temperature,
hour-month indicator variables and nonlinear controls for generation net of nuclear power are omitted. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.10: Average Effect of Wind Generation on CO2 Emissions in 2011
(1)
VARIABLES CO2 Emissions
Wind Generation -0.640***
(0.0168)
f(Generation-Nuclear) X
Observations 7,509
Observations are hourly and aggregated to ERCOT-level. Data is from 2011. Newey-West standard errors
with 53 lags used to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Coefficients for temperature,
hour-month indicator variables and nonlinear controls for generation net of nuclear power are omitted. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER III
Transitional Policy in Retail Electricity
Deregulation
3.1 Introduction
The retail electricity market for residential consumers has been deregulated in several re-
gions of the United States during recent years. Instead of residential consumers obtaining
electricity through a price-regulated monopolist, retail electricity providers obtain electricity
from wholesale markets, set their own retail prices and compete over residential customers.
However, when moving to a deregulated market policymakers do not completely deregulate
prices immediately. In practice, when given a choice of retail electricity providers (REPs)
many consumers do not actively pick and must be served by a default provider until they
do. Because of customers’ inertia in selecting a provider, temporary price regulation on the
default provider could help in the transition to a fully price-deregulated market.
Deregulated states have taken different approaches to managing this transition, usually
forcing the default provider to charge what regulators believe is a low price. However,
when Texas deregulated retail electricity prices in 2002, unlike in other states, their default
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electricity providers were directed to charge their consumers a relatively high price for several
years. This was intended to promote firm entry by allowing new firms to profitably undercut
the incumbent and to motivate consumers to switch to those new entrants. Texas has in
fact seen more consumers switch away from the default provider than any other deregulated
state. Could the Texas approach to transitional policy be preferable, given that consumers
have inertia when choosing a provider? If prices fall with market concentration and the
default provider’s market share, then transition polices that encourage the transition to a
low concentration environment, such as mandating a higher price for the default provider,
could be beneficial in the long run. However, as consumers historically appear to mostly
remain with their current provider in any given period, overcoming this inertia by imposing
higher prices on those consumers would likely have short-run costs, most notably the higher
costs imposed on consumers who did not switch.
Consumer inattention to the retail electricity market complicates the transition from a
regulated monopolist provider to a market where multiple firms can set their own prices
and compete; they likely make retail electricity deregulation less attractive. Initially most
consumers will be served by a default provider who could set a relatively high price to
“harvest”profits from these customers if allowed to set their own price, though optimally they
would not want to set price too high and cause suboptimal levels of switching away.65 Given
this, policymakers may prefer to continue to intervene in the market, at least temporarily,
to improve the transition to a deregulated market.66
65This is a kind of “investment” in retaining a large number of customers for the following periods.
66Policymakers could also have different objectives – Joskow [2008] notes that some policymakers in US
states have also, among other possible objectives, seemingly prioritized an immediate price cut to consumers
at the start of regulation, or neglected to adequately increase regulated retail prices as wholesale prices
rose. Note these policies can and have resulted the default provider’s regulated retail price being below
its wholesale costs. Additionally, the main purpose of deregulating retail electricity markets is to have a
competitive market with low prices; while low market concentration is generally associated with competitive
markets, reduced market concentration in and of itself should not be the final objective.
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More broadly, the question of whether retail electricity deregulation should be undertaken
has been discussed in the literature (such as Brennan [2007], Defeuilley [2009], and Joskow
[2000]). Paul Joskow writes that “there is no shortage of ideological views” regarding this
larger question (Joskow [2008]) Perhaps the most prominent potential benefits to deregulation
would be lower retail electricity prices and a greater variety of products to choose from.
Lower prices to consumers would be the result if competition between firms drove prices
lower than what would be obtained through cost-based price regulation. Swadley and Yucel
[2011] find that deregulation lowered residential retail prices in some states but not others.It
is possible that regions with greater scope for price improvements may be more inclined to
deregulate. While the actual electricity is a homogeneous good, retailers could distinguish
their products by offering varying levels of “green power”, different lengths of locked-in retail
prices and improved customer service. J.D. Power has begun to publish ratings of Texas
REPs in several categories.
A more desirable outcome than what would have been obtained under regulation is not
guaranteed with regards to pricing when deregulating the retail electricity market for res-
idential consumers. Consumer inertia appears to be present with most consumers rarely
comparing retail electricity providers and simply continuing to use their current provider
rather than the cheapest one. Not paying close attention to the choice of electricity retailer
could even be a rational choice given the financial stakes involved (Sallee [2014]). Some
consumers may not even be aware that they are allowed to choose electricity retailers. Fur-
thermore, consumers may incorrectly believe that the choice of retailer affects the reliability
of their electricity supply which would increase the risk of switching away from the default
provider.67 Depending on the institutional arrangements, there may be a financial cost to
67Supplying electricity to residences occurs in a number of stages: generation, transmission and distribu-
tion, and retailing. Generation, transmission and distribution are where the power is actually generated and
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switching providers. Finally, choosing a new firm and executing the move simply takes time
and mental effort.
This general reluctance to switch providers even when lower priced options are available
will affect the average price paid in a deregulated retail electricity market. Recent literature
suggests that large switching costs can result in higher equilibrium prices though there are
situations where switching costs can lower equilibrium price (Dube et al. [2009]). Addition-
ally, large switching costs could deter potential entrants from entering the market, which
could further affect the degree of market power participating retailing firms have.
In this chapter, I examine the impact of alternative transitional policies and any resulting
tradeoffs between the short and long run to determine if Texas’ approach to transitional policy
- with relatively high price floors - could be an improvement. To do so, I solve a dynamic
model of the residential retail electricity industry under various transitional policies and
examine the simulated market outcomes. In the model, deregulated firms set price each
period in order to maximize discounted profits, noting the market share they end the period
with will affect their profitability in the next period. One firm – the default provider – may be
price regulated for a certain number of periods and must set their price as directed, while the
entrant firms are always free to select their own price. Consumers face a two-stage problem
each period. In the first stage they decide whether to search for a potentially different REP
or to remain with their current provider without learning of alternate prices. In the second
stage, consumers that chose to search select an electricity provider.
moved to its destination over the power grid. While spot prices in the wholesale market are very volatile,
residential consumers pay infrequently and historically pay the same rate for all electricity consumed over
the billing period though the increasing use of ’smart meters’, which can record the time when electricity
was consumed in addition to the total amount, is changing this. REPs obtain power in the wholesale market
for their consumers and then charge the consumers a retail price. They thus serve as a financial middleman
between residential consumers and the wholesale electricity market. Depending on the institutional details
of the deregulation, they may become responsible for the actual billing as well.
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I find that, with the selected parameters for consumer demand, that it could be possible
for the“Texas approach”of higher transitional price controls to be superior to setting selected
lower prices for the incumbent firm. Furthermore, the simulated market outcome under
alternate parameters suggests that if consumers are less inattentive and are more likely to
shop for retail electricity, the resulting pricing outcomes are improved.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Retail Electricity Under Regulation
Deregulating the retail electricity market replaces imperfect regulation with what would
likely be imperfect competition (Puller and West [2013]). Traditionally the price of retail
electricity has been regulated, potentially at different rates for different customer classes
through rate cases, for a set period of time with the objective of allowing the electricity
provider to recoup their reasonable and prudent costs. If the wholesale electricity market is
competitive, then some of the cost that would need to be recouped is the cost of acquiring
electricity in the wholesale market.68 If retailers must purchase all of their electricity at
the spot market price, then the regulators should have an good understanding of what the
“reasonable costs” of that wholesale power should be. However if much of the wholesale
power is purchased under private negotiated bilateral contracts – as can be the case – then
68A competitive deregulated wholesale electricity market is crucial to the functioning of a deregulated retail
electricity market so that the entering REPs can obtain competitively priced wholesale electricity. Several
papers have looked at the competitiveness of these wholesale markets. Hortacsu and Puller [2008] find that
the Texas wholesale market is reasonably competitive. Mansur [2008] finds that when the rate at which
power generating units can shift output levels is taken into account the Pennsylvania/New Jersey/Maryland
market appears reasonably competitive as well.
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what the price “should” be is less clear.69 What “reasonable” costs are for other expenses
such as billing or customer service on the part of the retail electricity provider may also be
unclear. Uncertainty as to what the “correct” price should be could lead regulators to err on
the side of caution and set a higher price than could be obtained in the competitive market.
Additional choices for consumers is another potential benefit of deregulation.
3.2.2 Different Transition Policies and Outcomes in Deregulation
Deregulation of retail electricity for residential consumers has previously been undertaken
in a number of jurisdictions, both within the United States and internationally, such as
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, the United Kingdom
and New Zealand. News reports show that policymakers in areas such as Arizona, Indiana,
Michigan and Japan have been considering either deregulating retail electricity or further
expanding their current levels of deregulation in recent years.70,71Deregulated markets do
not share the same outcomes, however. A common approach in the industry to measure
the effectiveness of retail electricity deregulation policy is to examine the switching rate of
consumers: how many of them remain with the default provider? Table 3.13 shows that the
switching rate as of 2010 varied widely between states that have deregulated residential retail
electricity markets, suggesting large differences in the success of deregulation when using this
measure. However, while this measure does have the advantage of being easy to observe,
69In a slightly different context, Cicala [Forthcoming] finds that after deregulation, fuel procurement costs
for coal power plants – generally purchased through bilateral contracts but unlike electricity, a heterogeneous
good – fell by 12%. He also found that fuel procurement costs for natural gas plants, a homogeneous good
that is not generally traded with bilateral contracts, did not appear to be affected by deregulation. Similarly,
Jha [2015] finds that regulated coal power plants pay about 3% more per month for coal purchases and storage
than coal power plants that face market prices.
70Arizona: Randazzo [2013]. Indiana and Michigan: Malcolm [2013]. Japan: Reuters [2013]
71Note that Arizona ultimately decided not to further pursue deregulation, though this decision was driven
by their expectation that it would be found to violate the state constitution rather than a judgment on the
merits of the policy itself.
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it should not be mistaken for a direct observation of the competitiveness of the market (as
implied by the title of Alfred Kahn’s paper “Bribing Customers To Leave And Calling It
Competition”; Kahn [1999]).
These differences in switching rate outcomes can be attributed in part to different tran-
sitional policies between the states. Different approaches with respect to setting temporary
price controls on the default provider were used. When the temporary price controls ended,
Swadley and Yucel [2011] find that in some states, retail electricity prices rose while in others
electricity prices fell. Thus several years into the transitions, some states restricted the prices
of the default provider to be higher than what would have been seen in the market, while
other states restrict the default provider to price under the market price.72
Perhaps the simplest deregulation process would be to simply leave all the customers
with a default REP, allow entry of new competitors and immediately end price regulation.
However, given that customers are often slow to switch providers – initially they may not
even know that there is a market for retail electricity – the exercise of market power is a
potential concern. Temporary price regulation on the default provider is one solution to this
issue. Policymakers could face tradeoffs here.
On one hand, policies that discourage switching may detract from the development of a
competitive market. For example, having the default provider set a relatively low price for
electricity has obvious short-run benefits to consumers but a drawback is that it limits the
ability of other firms to obtain market share while making positive profits. Furthermore,
potential entrants may be discouraged from entering the market at all. If the expectation
when deregulating the market was a competitive market outcome would be preferable, this
competitive market outcome could be delayed or prevented by discouraging customer switch-
72Like Swadley and Yucel [2011], Kang and Zarnikau [2009] find that in Texas the retail prices of the
entrant firms fell after the end of price regulation.
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ing.
On the other hand, forcing the default provider to have a relatively high price – perhaps
even above what an unregulated monopolist would prefer to set – could induce higher rates
of switching early in the transition and could lower the market concentration in a more rapid
manner. However, this would come at the cost of higher retail prices for consumers who
are slower to switch during the period that they do remain with their default provider73.
The idea that allowing – or even requiring – high prices in the short term to lead to a
better outcome later is related to Fershtman and Pakes [2000], which finds that permitting
collusion between firms could be socially beneficial in the long run because it can induce
entry, in contrast to static models which would suggest that collusion is not socially optimal.
3.2.3 Retail Electricity Deregulation in Texas
Texas has five regions where retail price deregulation occurred beginning in 2002 (Figure
3.1).74 During the first five years of the deregulated market, the default provider in each of
the five regions was required to offer a regulated “price-to-beat” while other entrant REPs
could offer any price they chose.75 The price-to-beat was adjusted over time to account for
changing input costs and was different across the regions. Importantly, when setting the
“price to beat”, regulators included an additional markup which was intended to allow other
firms to profitably undercut the default provider. Thus, the regulated price of the default
provider was set in a manner that was intended to facilitate both entry into the market
and consumer switching, though this caused the consumers that did not switch away to pay
73I assume setting an extraordinarily high price to induce widespread quick switching or canceling elec-
tricity service to those consumers who do not pick a provider would not be politically viable.
74Interested readers should review Kiesling and Kleit [2009] for a more detailed description of the Texas
deregulation process.
75If the market share of the default provider had dropped below 60% in those first five years, the temporary
regulation would have ended early.
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higher prices than they “should have”.
Entrant firms generally priced lower than the price-to-beat during the transitional period.
Figure 3.2 shows the prices of selected major firms in one of the five regions in Texas over time,
as well as the wholesale price of electricity.76 Should consumers have switched away from
the default provider, they could have lowered their electricity bill. Even with this financial
incentive, consumers tend to remain with their current provider; even about a decade after
the start of deregulation, the default electricity providers still serve a substantial portion of
residential consumers (Figure 3.3). Again, consumer inertia appears to be a major issue in
this market.
3.3 Model of Retail Electricity Industry
In order to study transitional policies, I model the retail electricity industry and solve for
the optimal pricing decisions of firms under various conditions. I model both the consumer’s
optimization problem and that of the retail electricity providers.
At the start of every period, each firm begins with all the customers they had at the
end of the prior period and sets a price for that period. Consumers who were already in
the market and thus purchased electricity from one of the firms in the prior period observe
their firm’s price and decide whether or not to search for a (potentially) new retail electricity
provider. Consumers who moved into the market in the current period must search and
choose an electricity provider. Consumers who decide to search then observe the current
price of all of the firms in the market and choose to purchase their electricity from one of
them. At the end of the period, consumers purchase and consume a constant amount of
76Green Mountain Energy only sells “green” power which allows it to charge a higher price.
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electricity from their chosen firm.
To model retail electricity deregulation, the default electricity provider starts with the
entire market share. For a specified number of periods, that provider must set a price
determined by the regulator. A competing firm starts with zero market share but can always
set whatever price they wish.77 When the temporary price regulation on the incumbent has
expired, the incumbent can also price freely, just like the entrant firm. Any firm that is not
price-regulated maximizes expected discounted profits.
3.3.1 Model of Consumer Behavior
Consumer Inertia
In each period, consumers are assumed to make their decisions concerning their choice of
retail choice providers in two steps. In the first stage, the consumers decide whether to simply
remain with their current provider or whether to examine their options and potentially switch
to another provider. In the second stage, those consumers that do decide to search learn
the prices of all providers and select one, which may or may not be their current provider.
Consumers then consume electricity and pay their provider. All consumers must select a
provider and it is assumed that the quantity of electricity consumed does not depend on the
price.78 Consumers are myopic and in all situations only incorporate current prices into their
decisions.79
For consumers who were in the market in the prior period, the search decision is modeled
77I abstract away from firm entry and instead assume that at the beginning of the market there is one
other firm.
78Allowing consumption to depend in part of the price is not expected to substantially change the results
due to the relative inelasticity of electricity demand.
79In the context of gasoline price forecasts, Anderson et al. [2013] find that consumers’ gasoline price
forecasts are generally not distinguishable from a no-change forecast.
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as
SearchProbabilityit = Φ(α0 + α1Pft) (3.10)
where SearchProbabilityit indicates the probability of whether consumer i searches in
period t, Pift is the price of firm f in period t, where firm f is the initial provider at the
start of the period. Consumers are more likely to search if their current provider has set
a high price in the current period. The normal distribution is used to keep the probability
of search between zero and one. The price of the other firm does not affect the search
decision. When aggregated over a large number of customers, the search probability is also
the fraction of consumers that do search. Price is assumed to have the same effect on all
consumers’ decisions, both when deciding to search and later when choosing a provider.80
Consumers who have moved into the market at the start of the current period must search
for an electricity provider. I assume that no consumers leave the market.81
Selecting a Provider
When choosing between providers, consumers are assumed to have logit demand, so when
purchasing electricity from firm i in period t, consumer c receives utility:
Uift = β1Pft + εift
80Hortacsu et al. [2015] does find heterogeneous demand across demographic groups, however modeling
additional heterogeneity for the consumers would substantially increase the size of the state space in the
dynamic model of firm pricing behavior
81An alternative assumption that would not affect the model is that consumers who move out of the market
come from all of the firms in proportion to their size and that the measure of the quantity of move-ins is
instead a measure of net move-ins which is assumed to be non-negative.
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where Pft is the retail price charged by firm f and εift is an iid extreme value error term.
The probability that a searching consumer will select firm f is then
P (Firmf ) =
exp (β1Pft)∑N
j=1 exp (β1Pjt)
where N is the total number of firms in the market (two). Aggregating again over a large
number of searchers, this probability is also the fraction of searchers that will choose firm
f. This specification assumes that consumers do not systematically view the retail providers
differently on any dimension apart from price.82
An alternative way to incorporate consumer inertia into the model of the retail electricity
industry, apart from adding a first stage where consumers decide if they wish to search, would
be to incorporate switching costs into the provider choice decision. A key difference between
these two approaches is that unlike with switching costs, using a separate ’decision to search’
stage as specified above excludes other firm pricing from the inertia. If a firm keeps its price
sufficiently low, then it can keep the number of its consumers who choose to search arbitrarily
low, regardless of the prices of the other firms. On the other hand, using switching costs as
the source of consumer inertia implies that the inertia from consumers of a given firm can be
overcome by other firms if they set their prices sufficiently low. Given that in the data the
incumbent firms were able to maintain large market shares for many year even with other
firms offering lower prices, this model uses the ’decision to search’ stage as the source of
inertia in order to allow the incumbent firm to more effectively defend its market share.
82Hortacsu et al. [2015] finds that in Texas, consumers do initially view the incumbent firm more favorably,
though this effect falls by about 75% after just two years. This may be due to a mistaken belief that the
incumbent firm offers more reliable service.
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3.3.2 Deregulated Firms’ Problem
Firm Profit and Value Function
In period t, the profit for firm f conditional on having market share sft after the consumers
have selected their retail electricity provider for the period is
piit = (pit − c)(sftMt)
where c is the marginal cost of serving a customer and Mt is the total number of customers
in the market. The marginal cost is assumed to be constant over time and equal across firms;
all firms are assumed to have equal access to the competitive wholesale market for electricity
and I assume away any price-hedging issues. The size of the market grows with the number
of customers who move in during each period:
Mt = M0
t∏
j=1
(1 + ηj)
where ηt is the percentage of the market that is comprised of consumers who have moved
into the market in period t and must search for a provider.
The market share of firm f at the end of period t is then
sft =
{
sf,t−1 [1− Φ(α0 + α1Pft)] +
N∑
j=1
Φ(α0 + α1Pjt)
[
exp (β1Pft)∑N
k=1 exp (β1Pkt)
]}
1
(1 + ηt)
+[
exp (β1Pft)∑N
k=1 exp (β1Pkt)
]
ηt
(1 + ηt)
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If the default provider is price regulated, then it simply sets the price that regulators
direct.83 Firms that are not price regulated select the price to charge consumers in the
current period to maximize their expected discounted profits.84
Deregulated firm f faces the following Bellman equation:
V (s, s¯, T ) = suppE [pi(s
′, s¯′, p) + δV (s′, s¯′, T ′|p)]
Here, s is the firm’s market share level in the prior period (that they begin the period with)
and s¯ is a vector with the prior-period market share level of each of the deregulated firms.85
T is the number of remaining periods, including the present period, that the transitional
regulation will be in effect. When the transitional regulation ends, T is zero and the default
provider becomes a deregulated firm like the entrant. δ is the discount rate.
Firm Pricing Order
I also assume that firms do not price simultaneously. Instead, deregulated firms set their
prices in descending order of size. If two deregulated firms have the same size, then they set
their price in an order that is randomly assigned at the start of the period. This assumption
is made for tractability reasons; consumer inertia (whether in the form of a two stage decision
83In the case that regulators choose a sufficiently high or low price, this is equivalent to imposing a binding
price floor or ceiling.
84In practice, firms can offer multiple plans with varying attributes and prices. I assume in the model that
firms offer only one plan each.
85In practice, this is a vector with the number of other deregulated firms at each possible market share
level. The deregulated firms are identical apart from their initial market share level in each period.
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process or if modeled more straightforwardly with switching costs) leads to discontinuities
in the firm best response function for pricing decisions which in turn can potentially lead to
multiple or no pure strategy equilibria. Using sequential moves eliminates the potential lack
of a pure strategy equilibrium because the early firms cannot respond to the pricing choice of
later firms, and instead must take the smaller firms’ expected pricing choice into account.86
Intuitively, this discontinuity arises because as other firms raise their prices and cause
more of their customers to choose to search, it can eventually become marginally more
profitable to, instead of raising your own price slightly, jump down in price in order to
attract a large number of consumers from other firms. This strategy is essentially switching
from making profits with high markups to making profits with lower markups but with a
larger customer base that is obtained by acquiring many of the other firms’ customers.
The order of firm moves is set to be in descending order by size instead of random
assignment in order to generate more realistic results.87 When a relatively small firm goes
first, it is generally profit maximizing for them to set a very high price. The larger firms
respond by also selecting high prices that are somewhat under the smallest firm’s price
with the final results that many consumers search but do largely return to the larger firm.
86Ordered pricing does not affect the Bellman equation because there is no private information in the
model; all firms are able to anticipate pricing choices of all other firms given the initial state.
87Another specification that would allow firms with large market share to have an advantage would be to
change the consumer logit demand to favor larger firms and eliminate the search decision. If prior period
firm market share is added to the logit demand function and there is no first stage (all consumer search each
period) then the market share of each firm f in period t would be
sft =
exp(α1pft + αsf,t−1)∑
k exp(α1pkt + α2sk,t−1)
This specification has the benefit that the resulting best response functions for firm pricing decisions are
not discontinuous. However, this specification has the undesirable property that instead of allowing for
consumer inertia it instead makes it difficult for small firms to retain their market share when there is a
much larger firm present, assuming α2 is reasonably large. For example, in a two firm situation, a firm with
25% market share in the prior period would be forced to substantially undercut the firm with 75% market
share in the prior period just to maintain their current level of market share.
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Intuitively, the small firm can credibly signal (since they cannot change their selected price)
that they will not attempt to substantially increase their market size by acquiring the larger
firms’ customers and instead will try to earn profits through high markups.
The literature on switching costs have discussed a tradeoff that firms face between “in-
vesting” in acquiring new customers by setting a low price and “harvesting” profits from
current customers who face some inertia when considering moving (Farrell and Klemperer
[2007]). While the model in this chapter does not have switching costs, the tradeoff between
investing and harvesting when setting price remains the same because of the consumer inat-
tention stage. If small firms go first, they can credibly abandon any serious attempt to invest
in new consumers. However if the smaller firms go later, then the larger firms (who, regard-
less of the order in which they set their price, have less motivation to “invest” in acquiring
new consumers because they already have a relatively large market share) must consider the
potential for the smaller firm to later set a low price in an attempt to acquire customers from
the larger firms.
3.4 Market Simulations
In order to examine the impact of alternative transitional policies, I solve for the value and
policy functions and then simulate out the market under alternative policies. Additionally I
test for the sensitivity of these results when consumers are less inattentive.
3.4.1 Parameterization
In order to solve for optimal firm pricing decisions and simulate the evolution of the industry
under different transitional policies, I need to select demand parameters.
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For my baseline parameterization, I set the marginal cost of electricity at 5. The discount
value for firms is 0.925. The value of the constant term in the decision to search (α0) is -7.5,
the value of the price coefficient in the decision to search (α1) is 0.75 and the price parameter
in the logit demand model when deciding between firms (β1) is -4.0. With these parameters,
setting price equal to marginal cost results in virtually none of the customers deciding to
search for alternate REP options. If the price is raised to 7.5, then 3.0% of consumers
search, while if the price is set at 8.5 then 13.0% search. Setting β1 = −4 implies that when
consumers do choose to search they are quite price sensitive. A firm that has a price 0.25
less than the other will get about 73% of searching customers.
As an alternative specification, I make the consumers more likely to decide to search by
setting α0 = −7.0. With this increase, essentially no customers search if the retail price is
set at marginal cost, 8.4% search if the price is 7.5 and 26.6% search if the price is 8.5.
In selecting these parameters, a high level of price sensitivity when deciding between firms
was chosen due to the largely homogeneous nature of the product. The parameterization
of the decision of whether or not to search was selected so that firms could retain most of
their customer base if they chose to operate with low price-cost margins; the ability to retain
market share over an extended period of time appears to be a key feature of this market.
Additionally, the market expands by 1% each year due to new consumers moving into
the area.
Hortacsu et al. [2015] estimate consumer demand parameters using data from the early
period of the Texas retail electricity deregulation. However their model variants diverge from
the modeling approach described in Section 3.3 and are not directly usable. For example,
while they do also use the same general two-step model (decide whether to search; if so,
select a firm), they model the first stage “decide to search” decision by having a constant
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fraction of consumers search.88 When solving for optimal firm pricing with a two stage
“search decision/firm selection” model for consumers, penalizing high prices in the “search
decision” stage is critical in order to prevent firms from setting very high prices and gaining
very large profits from their old customers (who mostly would not search for other options).
Comparing the parameters used in this chapter to those in Hortacsu et al. [2015], the
probability of a consumer deciding to search is much lower in this chapter. This is because,
unlike in this chapter, Hortacsu et al. [2015] have switching costs in the firm decision stage.
Without those costs in the model and parameters from this chapter, all the consumer inertia
is placed into the search decision. Consumer demand elasticities at observed prices are
substantially higher in Hortacsu et al. [2015]. In their paper, the demand elasticity for an
entrant firm at the average price during the regulated transitional period is -4.51, whereas in
this chapter the demand elasticity for the entrant firm during the regulated period is around
-0.75, changing to a small degree depending on the transitional regulation that is used. Note
that the model in this chapter has one entrant firm, compared to the larger number of entrant
firms observed in the Texas data and used in the demand estimation of Hortacsu et al. [2015].
A more direct comparison of the demand elasticity used in this chapter and Hortacsu et al.
[2015] could examine the effect of all entrant firms simultaneously changing their price on
total entrant market share.
3.4.2 Market Simulations
As a baseline, I solve for pricing and value functions when there is no transitional regulation:
both firms can set their prices to maximize discounted profits in all periods. Figure 3.4 shows
88In an alternative specification, they also allow for consumers to be more likely to search if their bill
increases in recent months. However in my model I would prefer not to track firm pricing in earlier periods
as this would dramatically expand the state space.
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how prices of both firms evolve over 10 periods. Initially the incumbent firm sets a price of
$7.52 and stays close to this level for several periods before lowering price. The entrant firm
starts off at a lower price and price eventually grows to surpass the incumbent firm.
Figure 3.5 shows how the market share of the incumbent firm falls over the 10 periods,
plateauing around 75%. Figure 3.6 shows the average price weighted by market share.
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the evolution of market share and weighted price across alter-
native transitional regulations. In each of the alternatives, the incumbent firm must set a
price ranging from $6.50 to $9.00 in the first period before being able to optimize its price to
maximize discounted profits beginning in the second period. This range was chosen to en-
compass price controls at levels both below and above what the incumbent firm would prefer.
As expected, forcing the incumbent firm to set a price higher than it would prefer drives its
market share down faster (and vice versa). Forcing a relatively high price in the first period
causes the weighted price in the first period to be higher than it otherwise would have been,
but the price is lower in subsequent periods The reverse is true when forcing the incumbent
firm to price lower than it would have preferred. This indicates a short-run/medium run
tradeoff when setting transitional pricing regulations (weighted prices essentially converge
by the 10th period).
Table 3.14 shows the cumulative weighted price across the first 10 periods for each of
these transitional regulatory policies.89 Both regulations that set a price below what the
incumbent firm would have chosen result in lower cumulative prices paid by customers. The
results are mixed when forcing the regulated firm to set a price higher than it would prefer for
one period: for two of the studied policies, the cumulative price paid by consumers is higher
89Valuing the cumulative weighted price in this manner implicitly sets a discount value of zero. Incor-
porating a positive discount value would be straightforward and would make “high initial regulated price”
regulations worse as these have short run costs for medium run gains.
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than if there was no transitional price controls. However one of the policies ($9.00) results
in the cumulative average price over the first 10 periods being lower than a no-regulation
outcome. Furthermore, the cumulative price paid is even less than one of the price control
scenarios where the price was set to be less than the incumbent-preferred quantity ($7.00);
it is possible for a higher transitional price to yield a superior average result to a lower
transitional price.
Note that the overall market outcomes are sensitive to the demand parameters used.
With an alternative demand specification where consumers are more likely to search for a
potentially new electricity provider (α0 = −7.0), the market prices are lower than before, as
can be seen in Figure 3.8, which shows how prices change an unregulated market over the
first 10 periods. This is true even though market concentration is actually higher in the long
run, as seen in Figure 3.7
3.5 Conclusion
When deregulating residential retail electricity, consumer inattention will create imperfect
markets and can lead to a role for transitional price regulation. While many states chose to
price-regulate incumbent firms in a manner that had them set what was thought to be a low
price, Texas instead had the incumbent firms deliberately set a price that was thought to be
sufficiently high as to allow other firms to enter the market, undercut the incumbent and be
profitable. This did cause Texas to quickly have more entry and lower market concentration
than other deregulated states, at the cost of higher prices in the short-run. While this chapter
does not provide evidence that the Texas approach was superior to other states, the model
results do show that it is at least possible for higher incumbent prices in the first period
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to result in an overall lower average price over the first 10 periods than if specific lower
incumbent price had been set. Based on the range of first-period prices examined, increasing
the incumbent’s first period price could either raise or lower the cumulative average price
paid by consumers over the first 10 periods.
The model used in this chapter only had one entrant firm and exogenous entry. In
reality, Texas had a large number of entrant firms competing with the incumbent and entry
was endogenous. Increasing the number of firms would likely cause the entrant firms to price
lower than the current entrant firm does to compete more strongly to attract “searchers”
from the incumbent firm. An additional incentive to set a lower price would be to retain
customers already attached to the firm since reclaiming them in the future would be more
costly. Adding additional firms would not eliminate the process by which the “Texas-style”
transitional regulation has the potential to be preferable to some transitional regulations
imposing lower prices if long run weighted deregulated prices are lower than the incumbent’s
initial price.
For retail electricity deregulation to be a success, either the final deregulated markup
should feature low markups or regulators must have a difficult time setting the appropriate
regulated price. In environments where consumers are attentive, low markups in a long-
run deregulated market may be more likely. This could be the case for large commercial
customers, where the incentives to search for low energy prices are stronger. For residential
retail electricity deregulation, some effort to make switching easier and to educate consumers
about the existence of the market (and increasing the attention paid to the market) would
likely be beneficial in terms of the market price.
Setting a temporary, high price floor on the incumbent firm imposes short run costs on
consumers who do not switch, as their price is higher than it would have been under standard
99
cost-of-service regulation. The potential benefit is if competition can result in lower prices
than would have occurred under regulation and if encouraging entry and switching achieves
those lower prices more quickly. Given that deregulated retail electricity can only work in
areas with deregulated wholesale electricity markets, procurement costs should be reasonably
clear to regulators and likely limiting any potential spread between low market prices and
higher regulated prices. Thus while the “Texas approach” to retail electricity deregulation
policy could potentially be successful, it is a risky strategy.
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Figure 3.1: Service Zones of Deregulated Retail Electricity Markets
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Figure 3.2: Prices of Selected Firms in CenterPoint Region
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Figure 3.3: Market Share of Default Provider in Five Texas Regions
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Figure 3.4: Unregulated Prices Over Time
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Figure 3.5: Market Share Evolution By Initial Regulated Price
6
5
 
7
0
 
7
5
 
8
0
 
8
5
 
9
0
 
9
5
 
1
0
0
 
1
 
2
 
3
 
4
 
5
 
6
 
7
 
8
 
9
 
1
0
 
Market Share of Incumbent Firm 
P
e
ri
o
d
 
U
n
re
gu
la
te
d
 
$
6
.5
0
  
$
7
.0
0
  
$
8
.0
0
  
$
8
.5
0
  
$
9
.0
0
  
105
Figure 3.6: Weighted Price Evolution By Initial Regulated Price
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Figure 3.7: Evolution of Incumbent Market Share with Increased Customer Attentiveness
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of Prices with Increased Customer Attentiveness
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Table 3.13: Switching Rate Across States (2010)
State % Consumers Who Do Not Have Default Provider
TX 50.6
CT 24.6
OH 22
NY 17.9
MA 12.3
PA 11.3
MD 6.7
DC 3.4
DE 2.6
ME 2.6
NJ 0.5
IL 0.01
Source: Swadley and Yucel [2011]
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Table 3.14: Cumulative Prices for First 10 Periods With Alternate Transitional Policies
First Period Regulated Price Cumulative Weighted Price Difference vs Unregulated
6.5 72.831 0.788
7.0 73.266 0.354
Unregulated ($7.522 in 1st period) 73.619 –
8.0 73.786 -0.167
8.5 73.669 -0.050
9 73.218 0.401
Cumulative weighted price is the average price charged by firms, weighted by firm market
share. Without price regulation, the incumbent firm would set a price of $7.522 in the first
period
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APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A
Impact of Wind Intermittency on Generation Using
Ratios Instead of Levels
The main text commonly uses the level of natural gas generation as a dependent variable.
In those specifications, I control for the total level of fossil fuel generation, implying that
any increase in natural gas generation increases the share of fossil fuel generation coming
from natural gas. I rerun the specifications based on equation 1.4 using the ratio of natural
gas generation to total fossil fuel generation as the dependent variable. Equation 1.4 is
reproduced here with an updated dependent variable:
(
Natural Gas Generation
Fossil Fuel Generation
)
t
=β1Wt+
ψ[IntermittencyV arst]+
f(FossilFuelt)+
α0 + α1Tempt + α2Temp
2
t + γmHourMontht + t
I run four specifications, with different combinations of intermittency variables. These
are the same as in Section 1.6.3:
1. No intermittency variables
2. Standard deviation of expected wind generation (expected variation)
112
3. Uncertainty of wind forecast for upcoming hour (unexpected variation)
4. Standard deviation of expected wind generation (expected variation); Uncertainty of
wind forecast for upcoming hour (unexpected variation)
The coefficient estimates can be found in Table 4.15. As compared to the earlier results from
Table 1.2 where the dependent variable was natural gas generation levels, all variables except
for forecast uncertainty that were statistically significant earlier remain so. No variable
that was not statistically significant in Table 1.2 is statistically significant in Table 4.15.
Additionally, the signs on all coefficients are the same across Tables 1.2 and 4.15.
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APPENDIX B
Impact of Use of Instruments for Wind Generation
While the weather conditions that determine the maximum potential wind generation
are exogenously determined, the actual level of wind generation is determined by a combi-
nation of windspeed conditions, supply and demand in the wholesale electricity market and
transmission constraints. Wind power can be curtailed by grid operators for a variety of
reasons; mainly to address congestion issues on transmission lines. The main analysis uses
the high sustainable limit of wind generation used by ERCOT in the dispatch process as an
instrument for actual wind generation. The actual wind generation is on average close to the
high sustainable limit, though this was less earlier in the period studied. Initially in 2011,
approximately 5% of potential wind power was curtailed. By 2013, additional transmission
capacity was introduced and average wind curtailment fell to under 1%.
To test the importance of using instrumental variables and how this could change over
time, I redo specifications 1.1 and 1.3, reproduced here, without instrumentation.
Natural Gas Generationt =β1Wt + f(FossilFuelt) + α0 + α1Tempt + α2Temp
2
t+
γmHourMontht + t
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Natural Gas Generationt =β1Wt ∗ 1[year = 2011]t + β2Wt ∗ 1[year = 2012]t+
β3Wt ∗ 1[year = 2013]t + f(FossilFuelt)+
α0 + α1Tempt + α2Temp
2
t + γmHourMontht + t
Comparing the parameter estimates from Table 4.16 to Tables 1.2 and 1.4, instrumenting
for actual wind generation with potential wind generation does not result in substantial
changes, even for the effect of wind intermittency in 2011. As noted by Cullen [2013], if the
wind curtailment is simply caused by transmission congestion that itself is caused by high
levels of wind generation, this does not introduce endogeneity into the parameter estimates.
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Table 4.16: Impact of Wind Intermittency on Generation Mix Without Instrumentation
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Nat Gas Generation Nat Gas Generation
Wind Gen 0.0346*
(0.0178)
Wind Gen (2011) 0.0760***
(0.0235)
Wind Gen (2012) 0.0294
(0.0230)
Wind Gen (2013) 0.0181
(0.0287)
f(Fossil Fuel Gen) X X
Observations 23,665 23,665
Observations are hourly and aggregated to ERCOT-level. Data is from approximately 2011-2013. Newey-
West standard errors with 69 lags used to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Instrumental
variables not used. Coefficients for temperature, hour-month indicator variables and nonlinear controls for
generation net of nuclear and wind power are omitted. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX C
Market Power and Wind Generation Curtailment
ERCOT runs a bidding system as part of its procedures to determine which generators
will be assigned to generate power at any point in time. Generation resources submit a
bidding function stating the prices they they are asking for to provide given quantities of
electricity. One potential source of wind generation curtailment is that in the real-time
electricity market, the owners of the wind generation units could bid above their effective
marginal cost in an exercise of market power with the possible result that some or all of
the wind generation capacity does not end up dispatched by ERCOT. It is likely that wind
generation sources should have the lowest effective marginal cost of all generation sources in
ERCOT: the marginal cost of wind generation is near zero and additionally wind generation
is eligible for a federal per-unit subsidy which should push the effective marginal cost of wind
generation negative.90 If a wind unit’s production is curtailed because its bid curve into the
real-time market is high enough that some of the potential wind generation is not selected
for dispatch and is replaced by a higher-cost non-wind unit, this would be an example of
curtailment due to market power exercise.
It is relatively straightforward to identify occurrences in the data where attempted market
power exercise could be a contributing factor to wind curtailment. When examining the
wind unit bids into the real-time electricity market, if a wind unit is curtailed while the
90Some wind generators qualified for and took an investment tax credit in place of the production tax
credit as a result of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009; these turbines should not be
willing to submit negative bids, but still face zero fuel costs to generate electricity.
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marginal price for additional generation according to its wholesale electricity bid is positive,
the generation unit was likely bidding to sell output above marginal cost and that curtailment
was potentially related to the exercise of market power. This is not a complete determinant of
market power-based curtailment because this does not determine exactly if wind production
was curtailed and replaced with other generation sources with a lower bid. Instead this only
checks if a wind unit’s bids has the marginal price of additional output at their dispatched
level clearly above marginal cost and were curtailed.91
Examining bidding data from early 2011, 20.58% of curtailed wind generator observations
have a bid price greater than zero at the actual quantity produced. Table 4.17 gives summary
statistics for the bid price for the curtailed wind units at the actual quantity produced
when that number is greater that zero. This clearly shows that while about a fifth of the
observations of curtailed wind turbines have a positive marginal bid price, the vast majority
of these observations are extremely close to zero. Over 75% of these curtailed observations
with positive marginal prices have a marginal price of less than one dollar – far less than
the average price of $35.42/MWh over the Jan-Nov 2010 period. While there are a number
of curtailed wind observations where the marginal bid price was very high, indicating a
high likelihood of curtailment due to market power exercise – the highest marginal price for
observations where this value is positive is $62.93 – these are rare occurrences.
Table 4.17: Distribution of Positive Marginal Bid Prices for Curtailed Wind Units
Percentile 1st 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th 99th Max
Price ($) 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 5 5 62.93
91Some other generation types have negative bids as well for some range of output, but presumably this
is to maintain a minimum level of production and avoid shutdown costs. Note that this is directly related
to the discussion of curtailing wind to avoid shutdown of other units.
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